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Price Target (€) 16,57 €




52W Low/High (€) 4,60 - 7,41
Number of Shares (mn) 112,9
Market Cap (mn €) 811,6
Average Daily Vol. (k shares) 56,2






Price Target (€) 3,19 €




52W Low/High (€) 1,68 - 2,92
Number of Shares (mn) 767,5
Market Cap (mn €) 2.172
Average Daily Vol. (k shares) 202,4
Source: Bloomberg, Reuters & own calculations
Semapa: The Group Holding 
Semapa is a holding company that currently owns 78,1% of the pulp 
and paper producer Grupo Portucel Soporcel, 100% of the cement 
company Secil S.A., 96% of the small environment related company, 
ETSA Group and 50% of the Brazilian cement producer Supremo 
Cimentos S.A. .  
Portucel is the largest company under Semapa’s 
control, representing 72,7% of the group’s total 
revenue in 2012 (excluding holding costs). Secil follows, 
with 24,8% of the group’s revenues, while ETSA and 
Supremo account for the remaining 2,6% of revenues. 
Portucel: The Pulp & Paper Specialist 
Semapa’s main asset, Portucel is a paper & pulp 
producer with installed capacity for 1.585 thousand 
tons of paper and 1.590 thousand tons of pulp. 
Portucel also has backup operations in the energy and 
wood segments, representing 11% of the company’s 
total revenues. 
Secil: The Cement Producer 
Semapa acquired the remaining 49% of Secil in May 
2012. The cement company has a strong presence in 
Portugal, Angola and the North African markets of 
Tunisia and Lebanon, with a total of 6.850 thousand 
tons of capacity.  
ETSA: Environment & Waste Management 
ETSA is an environmental company that operates in the 
industry of collection and processing of animal waste. 
The company is 96% owned by Semapa and reported 
33M€ in revenues last year, accounting for 1,6% of the 
group’s total. 
Supremo: The New Acquisition  
Semapa acquired 50% of the Brazilian cement 
company in 2012. The company has an ongoing 




Historical Relative Share Price 
Performance 
Source: Bloomberg (March 2013) 
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Portucel has proven itself as a high performance 
producer, owning the largest and most efficient paper 
plants in Europe, continuously operating at near 100% 
capacity throughout the crisis and with expectations to 
carry on this way.  
The opening of the new paper mills have increased the 
integration of pulp in the paper production, thus 
reducing the company’s exposure to the pulp prices, 
which presented a volatility above 115% over the past 
12 years. 
Furthermore, the company operates in 115 countries 
throughout the world, with a wide variety of 
established brands, and a strong vertical integration 
model (energy, wood, pulp and paper) that allows it to 
mitigate to a large extent the inherent business risks. 
Besides pulp and paper price and demand, the main 
risk factors for companies in this industry are wood 
and energy prices. 
After the large investment in the new paper plant, the 
company’s plans are to further invest in its vertical 
integration and internationalization. The first step is 
already underway with the prospect of an investment 







Secil has managed to maintain its market share in the 
face of the recent decline in the construction sector in 
spite of a reduction in the operating margins. 
The company’s sales are directly dependent on the 
activity in the construction industry, which is highly 
sensitive to macroeconomic factors. 
DCF Assumptions 
t = 25,60%








Source: Reuters, Bloomberg 
& own calculations
Portucel (million €) 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Revenues 1.385 1.488 1.485 1.635 1.639 1.668 1.694 1.725
EBITDA 399 391 390 391 375 377 395 370
EBITDA Margin 29% 26% 26% 24% 23% 23% 23% 21%
EBIT 278 266 285 290 277 282 304 282
Net Financial Costs -20 -16 -25 -22 -26 -39 -41 -44
Income tax -47 -54 -73 -75 -64 -63 -67 -61
Net Income 211 196 187 193 187 182 196 178
CAPEX -96 -54 -40 -42 -43 -44 -45 -45
Dividends 0 165 103 106 103 100 108 98
Changes in WC -65 -17 -19 -16 0 -3 -2 -3
FCFF 167 251 258 259 261 258 271 249
Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations
Source: FOEX & own calculations 
Source: Portucel 2012 Interim Report 
Source: Secil 2012 Interim Report & own calculations 
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Semapa (mn€) EV Net debt Stake Equity Value
Portucel 2.842 462 78,1% 1.859
Secil 979 126 100% 853
Supremo 182 11 50% 86
ETSA 59 23 96% 35
Holding -141 820 -961
Total (mn€) 3.921 1.442 1.871
Shares (#mn) 112,9
Price Target (€/share) 16,57
Current Price (08 Feb. 2013) 7,19
Upside Potential (%) 130%
Recommendation BUY
Source: Companies' Annual Reports, Bloomberg & own calculations
For this reason, the company was seriously impacted 
by the recent crisis and the general decline in public 
investments in new buildings and infrastructures, 
which was particularly felt in Portugal. 
Secil’s strategy is to internationalize and to reduce the 
weight of the declining Portguese market. The obvious 
conclusion is that Lebanon, Tunisia and Angola’s 
construction industry play a central role in Secil’s 
future. 
While cement consumption should increase in these 
markets, Secil’s biggest challenge will be to maintain its 
market share despite the strong Chinese competition.  
t = 24,50%








Source: Reuters, Bloomberg 
& own calculations
DCF Assumptions Secil (million €) 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Revenues 536 507 488 477 482 496 505 516
Portugal 305 274 244 229 222 217 212 209
Lebanon 77 81 88 94 100 108 113 116
Tunisia 65 61 64 64 69 76 83 89
Angola 28 31 34 34 35 36 37 39
Cape Verde 6 7 7 7 7 7 9 10
Others 55 54 51 47 49 51 52 53
EBITDA 160 132 129 127 135 134 137 140
EBITDA Margin 30% 26% 27% 27% 28% 27% 27% 27%
EBIT 78 46 43 37 44 41 42 43
Net Financial Costs -5 -6 -7 -6 -7 -10 -12 -13
Income Tax -17 -10 -9 -8 -9 -8 -7 -7
Net income 56 30 27 24 28 24 22 22
CAPEX -44 -62 -34 -33 -34 -35 -35 -36
Dividends 29 18 21 15 14 12 11 11
Changes in WC -42 -12 35 12 3 -6 -1 -1
FCFF 55 45 119 96 94 83 90 92
Source: Secil  Annual Reports & own calculations
Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations 
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This dissertation aims to value the intrinsic value of the holding Semapa, applying the Equity 
Valuation theory. In order to apply the most suitable methods and appropriate assumptions, 
this paper firstly outlines the existing valuation frameworks and techniques, along with the 
academic debates on the most relevant valuation topics. The valuation is done as the sum of 
the parts of the companies owned by Semapa – Portucel, Secil, ETSA and Supremo – using a 
Discounted Cash Flow approach and the Multiples approach. Lastly, this dissertation compares 
the methods used and the results obtained to those of an investment bank, analyzing the 
differences with the purpose of understanding the reasons behind the dispersions of values 
obtained from different valuation methods.  
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The market value of a company is given by its stock price and reflects the general expectations 
of the investors and the impression they have of the company based on what they know about 
it. The problem is that no investor can know everything about the present and future of the 
company and industry, and therefore cannot make an absolutely precise valuation of the 
company’s current assets and future cash flows. This absolutely precise valuation of the 
company’s expected cash flows, discounted at the perfectly applicable discount rate, is called 
the intrinsic value of the asset (Damodaran 2006). The best valuation of a company is the one 
that estimates the closest value to the intrinsic value of its assets. 
The first step towards making a valuation is to decide which valuation method is going to be 
applied. The range of possibilities to choose from is wide and growing continuously, as new 
valuation methods are created and the more traditional ones are revised, tweaked and 
complemented, generating new methods for valuating companies. 
The existence of so many different methods and such a widespread academic interest on this 
matter can be explained by the fact that each approach offers a different perspective of the 
valuation problem, clarifying certain aspects while obscuring others (Young, Sullivan, 
Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999). The choice of “the right” valuation method is thus a matter of 
identifying which are the most relevant aspects of the company for valuation purposes and 
making a match between those company specific aspects and the existing valuation methods. 
Different authors consider different types of approaches, but in general terms there are four 
main valuation approaches (Damodoran 2006):  
1. Cash Flow Approaches (e.g. Dividend Discount Model, Discounted Cash Flow) 
2. Excess Returns Based Approaches (e.g. Dynamic ROE, Economic Value Added) 
3. Multiples Approaches (e.g. P/E, P/BV, EV/EBITDA) 
4. Options Approaches 
Each of these approaches can then be branched into specific valuation methods, taking an 
equity valuation perspective – estimate the value of the firm to equity holders - or an 
Enterprise Value perspective – estimate the value of the whole enterprise, the debt and the 
equity (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999). 
Each approach has its own merits and flaws and each its own utility, but no matter which 
method is applied, ultimately the assumptions made for the future are the main thing affecting 
the accuracy of the valuation. In fact, this thought is not recent and Modigliani & Miller had 
already come to this conclusion by 1961, arguing that any two approaches taken to valuing a 
company are equivalent and in no way opposing, as long as they are implemented correctly 
and take the same assumptions and basic accounts into consideration, adding that the choice 
between them is “a matter of taste and convenience” (F. Modigllani & M. Miller “Dividend 
Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares”, Journal of Business, 1961). 
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Nowadays, this philosophy is widespread in the field’s literature, with Young, Sullivan, 
Nokhasteh and Holt (1999) considering that “every popular valuation approach is simply a 
different way of expressing the same underlying model” and proving this mathematically, 
under certain assumptions (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999). Fernandez (2003) 
compares ten different DCF methods and proves that all of them give the same value if under 
the same assumptions, concluding that the only practical difference between them is the cash 
flows taken as a starting point for the valuation. Penman (1998) also came to the conclusion 
that any methods that are apparently different, if carried out correctly, will yield the same 
valuation. 
However, all this isn’t to say that the choice of the valuation method is irrelevant. Some 
methods may be inadequate considering the information available or the industry and the 
company at play, while others may neglect or miss value some specific valuable assets. 
Ultimately, any one method will offer only a partial picture of the company, from a specific 
point of view (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999). Taking an integrated approach, by 
selecting the most appropriate method and complementing it with another, will produce a 
fuller picture, improving the quality of the valuation. 
Although it isn’t the purpose of this study to detail all the existing methods for valuation, it is 
appropriate to explain each general approach and some relevant methods within them in 
order to substantiate the approach and methods chosen to undertake in the valuation of 
Semapa. Considering that what actually explains the valuation outcomes are the assumptions 
made, it is also relevant to describe the possible methodologies to deal with the different key 
inputs of the model that are subject to forecasts and assumptions (e.g. cost of capital, tax 
shields, growth rates, bankruptcy costs, etc…) and the industry specificities that may 
significantly affect the valuation. 
2. Return Based approach 
Returns Based approaches are based on the intrinsic concept of residual income. This concept, 
meanwhile, focuses on the premise that stockholder value is created only when the earnings 
on total invested capital are higher than the cost of that capital (Biddle, Bowen and Wallace, 
1999). The main difference between this and other methods is that it focuses on the excess 
returns, as opposed to all cash flows or net income. This way, the model highlights that 
earnings themselves don’t create value, but instead only earnings in excess of a required 
return (Damodaran 2006). 
Using this approach, the value of a firm is the value invested in it, plus the spread between the 
return and the cost of capital (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999 and Damodaran 
2006). This way, two main methods can be used to value a firm: 
 Dynamic ROE 
 
Market Value is current book value (BV) plus the discounted value of future excess returns 
(VA). Excess return is the difference between the return on equity capital and the cost of 
equity capital (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999). 
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 Economic Value Added 
 
Enterprise Value is current capital stock (K) plus the discounted value of future EVA. Excess 
return (EVA) is the difference between the return on capital and the cost of capital. Market 
Value is Enterprise Value minus the value of debt. K* is the equilibrium value of the capital 
stock in the terminal year (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999). 
Many authors consider this method to be a rearrangement of DCF (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh 
and Holt, 1999), however, Stern Stewart, the proprietor of EVA, argues that this method better 
correlates with stock returns and firm value than net income. Contrariwise, tests conducted by 
Biddle, Bowen and Wallace (1999) showed that this wasn’t true and in fact EVA and residual 
income “had little incremental information content beyond that contained in Net Income”. 
They conclude, in the same paper, that EVA is a good tool to align managers with shareholders’ 
interests and to be used for internal incentive purposes.  
However, in what concerns the valuation of Semapa, this method proves to be inadequate as 
“it conveys little news to market participants regarding the firm’s valuation” (Biddle, Bowen 
and Wallace 1999). 
 
3. Options approach 
This approach, also called contingent claim valuation, is very useful for valuing specific 
situations where a company has a future option (Damodaran, 2006). This can be the case, for 
example, for companies with new technologies that aren’t yet being used to create value but 
can be in the future or companies with product development ideas that haven’t been 
implemented yet (Luerhman, 1997). 
More generally, any investment done today that, instead of direct cash returns, produces the 
opportunity to engage in some kind of value-generating activity in the future, should be valued 
using an options approach. This means that the company has the right, but not the obligation, 
to exploit this opportunity. Ultimately, the decision may be not to engage in this activity, but 
the option to do it or not is valuable nonetheless (Luerhman, 1997). In fact, as Luerhman 
(1997) put it “for some companies, opportunities are the most valuable things they own”. 
Typically options methods are used to value stock options. The most commonly used method 
is the Black-Scholes Model. In short, this model uses probability theory applied to discounted 
cash flows and expected value calculations to compute the underlying value of the stock 
option (Black and Scholes, 1973). 
This approach, however, is largely considered by the field’s academics as more complex 
(despite being an oversimplified version of reality), less intuitive and harder to apply than 
other classic methods such as DCF or multiples. Even the more fierce defenders of this 
approach recognize that it should be used as a complement, and not a replacement, of 
another method (Luerhman, 1997). 
Therefore, an options approach will only be used in this paper if an objective and significant 
future opportunity for Semapa is detected. 
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4. Multiples approach 
In the multiples approach the company’s value is estimated based on analogous information 
from similar companies. For this reason, and unlike the other valuation methods, it is 
considered a relative valuation. It values an asset by observing the pricing of other assets 
deemed “comparable”, relative to a common variable such as sales, enterprise value, earnings 
or cash flows (Damodaran 2006). 
The successful application of this approach is dependent on two critical factors:  
 The peer group chosen to compare the company to;  
 The multiples chosen as most appropriate to value the company. 
There are many different methodologies and views on how to choose the most appropriate 
peer group. As Bhojraj and Lee (2001) state in their paper “Who is my peer?” this process is 
often viewed by practitioners as ”an art form that should be left to professionals”. According to 
these authors, peers should be chosen based on the variables that drive the differences in 
ratios within the industry. 
There are plenty of variables driving differences in ratios in every industry. However, some 
factors seem to overlap in most articles on the subject, indicating that they are the most 
crucial indicators for choosing a peer group. These factors are: 
 the industry; 
 risk exposures;  
 earnings, costs and profitability; 
 growth rates; 
 cost of capital; 
 capital structure.  
Choosing companies operating in the same industry is a must, as the industry’s specificities 
and volatility explain a big parcel of the company’s earnings and growth perspectives. Finding 
these companies is a good start, however, it isn’t enough. Companies in the same industry can 
still differ significantly by size, stability, profit margins, growth perspectives, capital structures 
and even the operational activity, portfolio of products and risk exposure.  
For this reason, the companies should be analyzed in detail to guarantee they have a similar 
modus operandi in terms of products/services offered, general operations and risk exposure. 
The following triaging step should be to use companies with similar market capitalization, ROIC 
and growth projections (Goedhart, Koller and Wessels, 2005). 
The “peer group” is the group of identical companies obtained after filtering out all 
inconsistent ones, according to the relevant indicators. If the selection was done right, the 
average multiples from this peer group should give us a rough picture of the company we are 
analyzing. 
So, after having the right peer group, which multiples should be used?  
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Liu, Nissim and Thomas showed in the paper “Equity Valuation Using Multiples” (2001) that 
forward looking multiples are the ones that best explain stock prices, followed by historical 
earnings measures, cash flow measures and book value of equity, while sales based multiples 
perform the worst.  
This ranking proved to be the same for all industries analyzed, leading the authors to conclude 
that different industries don’t have their own “best” multiple, but instead, the right multiples 
should be applicable to every industry.  
These ideas were followed by Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2005), who add that P/E multiples 
can be manipulated by capital structure and therefore be misleading. They suggest using 
Enterprise Value multiples instead. 
This view is shared by Liu, Nissim and Thomas (2001) who argue that enterprise based 
multiples are superior to equity based multiples, founded on the argument that the second 
can be influenced by the company’s capital structure. For this reason, enterprise based 
multiples make it easier to find truly comparable peer groups and thus improves the accuracy 
of the valuation. 
On the other hand, using an equity perspective can simplify the analysts’ life in the sense that 
he doesn’t have to consider debt. While this simplification has its benefits and widens the 
range of potential comparable companies, it can be misleading since companies with 
significantly different leverage ratios are not comparable, even if we are only comparing the 
equity value. 
Despite all these minor discussions regarding the peer group selection criteria and the best 
multiples to apply, the multiples approach is widely viewed as the simplest. Although it is 
subject to appropriating any mistakes done in the previous valuations of the peer companies 
analyzed, it is a good way to complement another method used to estimate the company’s 
intrinsic value (e.g. DCF method). 
Unlike the options approach, that should be used to value a specific opportunity for the 
company, multiples can be used to do a “reality check” and to get an overall picture of the 
range of values for the whole company (Goedhart, Koller and Wessels, 2005). This is the way 
the multiples approach will be used in this paper: as a complement to a DCF method.  
Given the vast number of existing multiples, I will not analyze all of them in detail in this paper. 
Instead, I will select a few of the most commonly used multiples, from both an equity and an 
enterprise perspective.  
Some of the multiples that will not be analyzed in this paper include: 
Equity perspective: 
 Dividend yield 
 Price/Sales 
 Price/Cash Flow 
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 FCF yield 
 EV/Invested Capital 
 
4.1. Price to Book Value (P/B) 
P/B is an equity perspective multiple. This multiple is best used for capital intensive firms that 
depend on a high asset base (e.g. banks). It compares the company’s market value to its 
intrinsic book value. It is computed by dividing the share price by the last quarter’s tangible 
assets’ book value per share. 
     = 
           
                              ⁄
 
Investors often look at companies with low P/B as potential growth targets. This multiple 
indicates the value that the market is placing on the assets of the company. Therefore, if the 
multiple is low, than the assets are undervalued. 
The limitations of this multiple are related to the lack of reliability of the book value of the 
assets reported. This happens mainly for three reasons. For one, the assets are reported at 
historical cost. Secondly, they are referring to the value at the date of the report. And lastly, 
the report of the book value is subject to many different accounting policies. For all of these 
reasons, the analyst must be very careful when using this multiple. 
4.2. Price to Earnings (P/E or PER) 
P/E is the most commonly used equity multiple. One of the reasons for this is that all the 
needed information is widely accessible for any quoted company. All we need is the share 
price and the earnings per share (EPS). 
    = 
           
                  
 = 
                     
          
 
A high P/E multiple may indicate that investors are expecting higher earnings growth in the 
future. One of the attributes of this multiple is that it relates company value to profit. 
However, if profits are negative the EPS will be negative. In this case the multiple can’t be used 
to estimate the firm’s value. 
Another deliberation that should be made when using this multiple is which year’s net income 
should be used to estimate the current value of the firm. One can use last year’s value or the 
forecasted value for the end of the current year. Both options can be used if they are properly 
supported, guaranteeing that no extraordinary revenues or expenses, that will not be repeated 
in other years, happened during that period. 
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4.3. Enterprise Value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) 
This is the most popular enterprise multiple. The main reason is the fact that it includes debt 
through the EV and therefore allows comparisons between companies with different capital 
structures. It is also very simple to compute: 
          = 
                
      
 
Low EV/EBITDA multiples is a signal of a good takeover candidate. This happens because the 
multiple intrinsically includes the debt that the acquirer would have to assume. Another 
positive aspect of this multiple is that, as opposed to EV/EBIT, it is neutral to depreciation and 
tax policy, making it a good measure for cross-national comparisons. 
On the other side, ignoring depreciations and taxes may also lead to omissions of value 
created through taxes or depreciations. Also, being a very cash-dependent multiple, it is very 
susceptible to variability caused by growth rates, earnings estimates or cycles in the industry. 
 
5. Cash Flow approach 
 
“Discounted cashflow (DCF) valuation, relates the value of an asset to the present value of 
expected future cash flows on that asset.” 
(Damodaran 2006) 
Based on my research, this approach is clearly the most popular and academically acclaimed. It 
is based on this premise that the present value of an asset is the sum of all future cash flows 
on the asset, discounted back at a rate that reflects the riskiness of these cash flows 
(Damodaran 2006). In practice, it stands on the principle that the value of an asset is based on 
its ability to generate cash and value, and not on what people perceive it to be worth. 
This approach rests on four main inputs: 
 Earnings and cash flows 
 Growth rate 
 Discount rate 
 Judgement on when the company will enter the “steady state” 
DCF entails forecasting all free cash flows until they stabilize (“steady state”). By applying a 
perpetual growth to these cash flows, a Terminal Value is computed. The sum of this Terminal 
Value and all forecasted Free Cash Flows, discounted back to present using a discount rate (r), 
is the value of all the company’s assets. This output of a typical DCF valuation is the Enterprise 
Value (EV). The equity value is obtained by deducting all types of debt from the EV. 
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Although this seems straightforward, there are in fact many variants of the DCF method itself. 
Most relevant disagreements in academia derive from the differences in perspective that 
Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt (1999) considered to bifurcate all valuation analysis. 
Fernandez (2003) and Damodaran (2006) generalized three major techniques to apply a DCF 
method: 
1. From an equity holder viewpoint, discounting the expected cash flows to equity at the 
cost of equity 
2. From the viewpoint of all claimholders, using the weighted average cost of capital to 
discount expected cash flows 
3. Valuing the business first, as if it had no debt, and then compute separately the added 
value of having issued debt (APV) 
DCF is the simplest approach to use for firms with positive, reliable and fairly stable cash flows 
and where risk can be estimated with some precision. This may not be the case if the firm has 
any significant unutilized assets, patents or any other product options that would invite an 
Options Based valuation. It may also be troublesome to apply DCF if the firm is in trouble or 
undergoing significant restructuring that may affect the predictability of expected cash flows 
and the usefulness of historical data (Damodaran 2006). 
As I will show later in this paper, Semapa is a cyclical company, undergoing relevant 
acquisitions and with some fast growing segments. However, for reasons I will explain along 
the paper, its cyclical characteristics will not endanger the company or significantly affect the 
cash flows’ predictability, and the major acquisitions that happened during the present year of 
2012 will not affect the operations of the company, but only the scale of the cash flows. The 
only exception is the acquisition of 50% of the Brazilian cement company Supremo, but this 
case will be analyzed individually. 
For this reason, and taking into consideration that Semapa has no relevant unutilized assets or 
product options, the Discounted Cash Flow approach was chosen as the most appropriate to 
value Semapa.  
5.1. Equity Cash Flow (ECF) 
One way to apply DCF is taking an equity perspective. This method is called Equity Cash Flow 
(ECF) or Flows to Equity. It is a straightforward measure used to estimate the cash flows to be 
paid to equity holders. This method considers only the cash flows to equity and discounts them 
at the required return on levered equity (Ke) (Luerhman, 1997 and Fernandez, 2003). The 
output of this approach will be the value of equity. Thus, the value of debt must be added to 
compute the full Enterprise Value. 
E = 
    
       
 + 
    
       
 + (…) +  
    
       
 
The main differences to the other methods are the cash flows and the discount rate used. The 
cash flows to equity are computed as the free cash flows deducted from all debt charges and 
repayments, therefore yielding only the cash available to equity holders (mainly dividends and 
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share repurchases). The discount rate (Ke) is the rate of return required by the equity holders, 
which is different and independent from the cost of debt (Kd). 
This sort of method is useful when deb cash flows should be examined explicitly (Damoadaran, 
2006). However, in the Semapa case the company’s capital structure and debt levels are stable 
and not too significant. Therefore, this method offers no added value to the valuation at hand. 
5.2. Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
APV consists on separating the valuation in two parts:  
a) The operational value of the company and;  
b) The value of all financing side effects        (Luehrman, 1997) 
The main advantage of this method is its simplicity. APV is based on the principle of value 
additivity: it splits the company into pieces, values each piece individually, and adds them back 
together. The sum of all the pieces equals the Entreprise Value (Luerhman, 1997).  
In simple terms, the firm value under an APV method can be summarized as: 
Value of business = Value of business with 100% equity financing + Present Value of 
Expected Tax Benefits of Debt – Expected Bankruptcy Costs        (Damodaran, 2006) 
This method supports the idea that companies don’t set debt targets as a percentage of 
market value, but instead as an absolute value (Damodaran, 2006) and, as opposed to the 
WACC approach, APV uses the required return to assets as the discount rate, which is not 
affected by capital structure changes (Fernandez, 2003). 
On the paper entitled “WACC or APV?” Jaime Sabal pointed out that APV’s virtues are very 
useful when valuing small companies with unstable debt ratios, or companies operating in very 
volatile industries, countries with complex or inconstant tax legislations or anywhere with high 
economic uncertainty affecting the leverage of the company. On the other hand, for larger 
companies operating in advanced and stable countries, WACC is a more appropriate method. 
Semapa, however, stands out for the reliability of its earnings and their high stability levels, 
even in volatile countries, and particularly the high efficiency of its biggest division, which is 
the pulp and paper company, Portucel. Therefore, calculating the impact of debt separately 
from the value of the firm is not necessary, deeming WACC a suitable method to value the 
company. 
5.2.1. Tax Shields 
The main source of disagreement regarding the APV calculation is the way to value the tax 
shields. 
There are many theories regarding this subject. Modigliani and Miller (1963) stated that the 
value of tax shields could be computed by discounting the expected future tax shields at the 
risk free rate (Rf). Myers (1974), Taggart (1991) and Luerhman (1997) propose using the cost of 
debt (Kd) as the discount rate for the tax shields. Harris and Pringle (1985) and Kaplan and 
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Ruback (1995) defend that the required return to the unlevered equity (Ku) should be used 
instead. Miles and Ezzel (1980) accept both perspectives, but state that the most appropriate 
way to discount the tax shields is using Kd for the first year and Ku for the following years. 
The main difference in perspective can be summarized in two different strands: 
 Those who believe that the risk of the tax savings arising from the use of debt is the 
same as the risk of debt itself (Fernandez, 2003); 
 And the others, who believe that the level of debt is volatile and varies according to 
the operational needs of the company and, for this reason, the risk of the tax shields is 
the same as the operational risk of the company (Fernandez, 2003) 
Fernandez (2004) went even further on his paper entitled “The value of tax shields is NOT 
equal to the present value of tax shields”, arguing that the value of tax shields should be 
computed as the difference between the value of the levered firm, with tax savings included, 
and the same firm as if it was unlevered, without any tax savings. However, Cooper and 
Nyborg (2006), supported by Damodaran (2006), have proven this theory wrong, showing that 
the value of tax shields should be computed as the present value of expected tax savings 
discounted at the cost of debt (Kd). 
There is definitely no consensus regarding this subject. Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) 
state that there is no single method that is “theoretically correct”, but instead each analyst 
should choose the approach that best suits the situation.  
5.2.2. Bankruptcy Costs 
Bankruptcy costs are part of Modigliani and Miller’s theory on optimal capital structure. They 
already understood by then that bankruptcy costs are the reason why a company can’t be fully 
leveraged. Bankruptcy costs should be balanced with tax shields to obtain the optimal capital 
structure. 
However, Modigliani and Miller didn’t leave a clear explanation of how bankruptcy costs 
should be computed for a running company and no academic has generated a consensual 
theory since. In simple terms, the expected bankruptcy costs can be computed as: 
Expected Bankruptcy Costs = Probability of Bankruptcy x PV of Bankruptcy Costs 
(Damodaran, 2006) 
This is based on the assumption that a higher level of debt will result in a higher probability of 
default and thus higher bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977). Although not computed separately, 
this value is included indirectly on the WACC method, reflected as higher costs of debt and 
equity as default risk increases (Damodaran, 2006). However, in the APV method, this value 
must be computed separately, which is the source of some disagreement around this method. 
The general figure that is most commonly used in the modern days as an estimate of 
bankruptcy costs is 20% of the value of the estate. This value can be traced back to Baxter’s 
paper in 1967 and was later supported by Stanley and Girth (1971) and Van Home (1976). 
However, the more recent papers of Warner (1977) and Miller (1977) seem to disagree. Their 
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argument is that the earlier papers were based on individuals or small sized companies, 
sometimes even undergoing liquidation processes, instead of reorganization. Warner’s study 
shows that that the ratio between direct bankruptcy costs and the market value of the firm 
decreases as the value of the firm grows. He also shows that for big firms (in his case he used 
railroad companies) the average cost of bankruptcy usually ranges between only 1% and 5% of 
the market value of the firm before going bankrupt. 
These large discrepancies, that were never completely resolved, show how difficult it is to 
accurately estimate these costs, which can have a significant impact on the company’s value. 
This difficulty can be partly explained by the impracticality of measuring the indirect 
bankruptcy costs, such as the energy and time dispersed by managers from other tasks or the 
averseness of customers and suppliers to enter into long-term commitments (Miller, 1977). 
5.3. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
The WACC is the most widely used DCF method for firm valuation. Since it is a “firm method” it 
uses the free cash flows to the firm as the basis for valuation while the cost of capital, as the 
name says, is calculated as a weighted average between the cost of equity and the cost of 




 x Kd x (1-t) + 
 
 
 x Ke 
As opposed to APV, it aggregates the effects of tax shields in the discount rate. This way, the 
value added by interest tax shields is automatically included in the present value of the firm 
(Luerhman, 1997). For this reason, the accuracy of this method is higher when the debt to 
capital ratio is stable. 
On the other hand, using the same WACC over periods of significant capital structure changes 
may lead to valuation errors. For this reason, when using this method for companies with 
complicated capital structures or fund-raising strategies, WACC should be used very carefully 
and adjusted periodically (Luerhman, 1997). 
 
5.3.1. Growth Rate 
One very important and hard to determine figure in any valuation is the expected growth rate 
for the forecasted period and the terminal value. This is a prediction by the analyst of the 
growth at which the company will grow in the future. If this could be accurately predicted, any 
investor would know exactly where to invest. Since it isn’t so easy, we are left with a few 
estimation techniques. In “Growth Rates and Terminal Value” Damodaran suggests three main 
approaches: 
 Looking at the company’s past – the historical performance and growth of the 
company’s earnings are a good base for predicting future behavior, assuming that 
conditions are met to behave in line with the past. 
 Looking at the competitors – the expected growth rates for companies in the same 
industry should not be very different from eachother, and therefore taking a relative 
Equity Valuation – Grupo Semapa 
 
   
18  
 
approach and comparing the industry (or a peer group) average as the estimate for the 
company can be a viable option. 
 Looking at the fundamentals – taking into consideration what the company is 
investing and how much returns these investments are making, and assuming the 
investment rate and the return on investments will be stable in the future, the growth 
rate can be extrapolated.  
Regardless of the technique used, the analyst should have well-defined criteria to choose the 
historical period. For cyclical companies, for example, this period should include an entire 
cycle. Additionally, any abrupt changes in past growth rates should be analyzed and explained, 
in order to understand if they are likely to be repeated or not. A sustainability analysis should 
also be conducted to verify if it is plausible that the present (or estimated) growth rates are 
going to be maintained into maturity. 
5.3.2. Terminal Value 
“The terminal value is generally by far the most important element in any valuation estimate.” 
These words were written by Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt (1999). These authors argue 
that basing all the valuation on the terminal value estimate is not as incongruous as it may 
seem. In fact, their findings are that the terminal value represents on average 94% of the total 
firm value if three annual forecasts are made. This value is reduced to 79% of the total if ten 
annual forecasts are made. Nevertheless, the terminal value will represent a very sizable 
portion of the overall valuation. 
Although computing merely the terminal value is definitely not the best way to achieve an 
accurate estimate for the overall value of the company, estimating it right is vital to that goal. 
In that sense Damodaran recognized three different ways to compute the terminal value. 
The first is considering the liquidation value of the company. If the assets are separable and 
marketable, then we can estimate how much they are worth and compute the present value. 
The second is a relative approach. In this case the analyst would simply use multiples from 
comparable companies and apply them to the company under analysis. 
The other option is in Damodaran’s opinion the “technically soundest”. It is based on the 
assumption that the company will grow at a stable rate. The problem with this approach is that 
it requires judgment about when a company will grow at a stable rate, what is this rate and if it 
is sustainable. 
Terminal Value = 
     
        
 
Techniques to estimate the growth rate are described above, but in the terminal value’s 
specific case some other considerations mustn’t be overlooked. Since we are speaking of a 
perpetual growth rate the sustainability analysis should impose a cap on the growth rate that 
should be, at most, the economy’s growth rate. Damodaran suggests the risk-free rate as a 
proxy for the nominal growth rate. 
Equity Valuation – Grupo Semapa 
 
   
19  
 
The definition of the beginning of the perpetual stable growth period can also be problematic. 
Typically, companies don’t grow above the industry average for long periods of time, but 
defining the exact duration of this period has to be done case-by-case (see Appendix 1). 
5.3.3. Valuation of companies operating in cyclical industries 
Calculating the terminal value for a company operating in a cyclical industry becomes even 
more complicated. De Heer, Koler, Schauten and Steenbeek (2000) gathered empirical 
evidence showing that analysts commonly make valuation mistakes when valuing cyclical 
companies. 
The main reason for this occurrence is precisely the terminal value, since it is computed based 
on the cash flows from the last forecasted year (FCFF𝑛). If this year is in the peak or close to 
the peak of the cycle, we will overvalue the company. If, on the other hand this year is in the 
bottom of the cycle, the terminal value will be understated. 
The best way to face this problem is to normalize earnings, cash flows and growth rates 
throughout the entire cycle (De Heer, Koler, Schauten and Steenbeek, 2000 and Damodaran, 
2009). This way the value used as the base for the terminal value calculation will reflect a 
normalized value of the whole cycle instead of a specific point in the cycle. 
Some general additional reflections, summarized by Damodaran (2009), must be made for 
commodity companies. For one they are price takers. For this reason the earnings’ variance 
closely reflects the price cycles of the commodities that the company deals with.  
Another fact that shouldn’t be neglected is that the factories may be forced to keep operating 
all through the price cycle to avoid the costs of shutting down and reopening. This supports 
the idea that these types of companies are more subject to macro moves and therefore may 
have higher expected bankruptcy costs are more volatile debt ratios. 
Finally, we must consider that commodities are finite. The impact of this feature must be taken 
into account for future commodity prices and perpetual growth estimation. 
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6. Company Introduction - Semapa 
Semapa is a holding company that was founded in 1991 and has controlling stakes in industrial 
companies, mainly in the cement and pulp & paper industries. Semapa’s first relevant venture 
started in 1994 with the acquisition of 51% of Secil, a Portuguese cement company. 
Following the acquisition of an additional 7,94% stake of Secil in 1995, Semapa acquired a 4,7% 
stake in Cimpor, a large Portuguese cement company. In the year 2000 the company acquired 
another stake of 4,3% of Cimpor and attempted the full takeover of the company, which would 
fail. 
In 2000 Semapa started its internationalization with the acquisition of a Tunisian cement 
company, “Societé des Ciments de Gabés” and the launch of a cement subsidiary in Angola 
(“Tecnosecil”). The internationalization process progressed in the following years, with the 
acquisition of stakes in Algeria, Lebanon and Cape Verde by Secil. 
2004 was to some extent a turning point for Semapa. This was the year it entered the pulp & 
paper industry, by acquiring 67% of Portucel. At the same time, Semapa reduced its presence 
in the cement industry, selling its 9% stake of Cimpor as well as a 49% stake of Secil in a 
transaction that valued 100% of Secil’s EV at nearly 900 M€. 
In 2005 Semapa sold its 90% stake in Enersis, an electric power company it created in 1994. 
This deal was worth over 420 M€, which meant a capital gain of 390 M€ for Semapa. 
Until 2009 Semapa reinforced its position in Portucel, finishing the year with a 77% stake, 
reinforced its international status by acquiring new stakes in cement companies in several 










Source: Semapa Annual Report 2011 Figure 1: Sem pa Gr up Structure in 2011 (Source: Semapa Annual Report 2011) 
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During the 2nd trimester of the current year of 2012 Semapa continued its internationalization 
process through the acquisition of 50% of the Brasilian “Supremo Cimentos S.A.”, which is a 
cement company undergoing an expansion plan that will increase its production capacity to 
1.700 million tons. Also, Semapa further strengthened its presence in the cement industry by 
acquiring the remaining 49% of Secil. 
As of the end of 2011, when the 
last year-end Semapa report was 
published, Portucel had a 83,6% 
weight on the total sales of the 
group. If we exclude the other 
Holdings and consider only 
Portucel, Secil and ETSA, 
Portucel’s weight on Semapa’s 
total Net Income for 2011 is 
nearly 90%. 
Even if we consider the sales for 100% of Secil (instead of the 51% owned by Semapa then) and 
50% of Supremo (that was acquired this year), Portucel still represents over 73% of the group’s 
total sales. This goes to show that the Pulp & Paper segment is by far the core value driver for 
Semapa. 
6.1. Portucel Soporcel Group 
Portucel Soporcel Group is the core business of Semapa. It operates in the pulp & paper 
industry and is currently the European market leader in the market for premium office paper 
with the brand Navigator. 95% of Portucel’s sales are exportations. It sells pulp and paper to 
115 countries all around the world and its exportations represent 3% of Portugal’s total 
exportations. 
The company results from three different Portuguese companies: Portucel, Soporcel and 
Papéis Inapa. 
Portucel was founded in 1953 producing raw pine pulp in a single plant in Cacía, Aveiro. In 
1957 it introduced the production of sulphate bleached eucalyptus pulp, which was a 
worldwide innovation.  
In 1964 Papéis Inapa opened its operations. It used the pulp produced by Portucel to produce 
paper that was sold throughout Europe. Inapa used three paper mills in Setúbal, integrated 
with Portucel’s eucalyptus pulp mill. 
Soporcel started producing in 1984, after being created in 1979. Its operations are based on 
the production and sale of uncoated wood-free paper (UWF). It currently has two industrial 
units at Figueira da Foz (founded in 1991 and 2000), which are some of the most 
technologically advanced factories in the industry. 
Figure 2: 2011 Semapa Group Turnover (Source: Semapa Annual Report 
2011) 
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The Portucel Soporcel Group resulted from the combination of these three companies, 
increasing the efficiency levels due to vertical integration processes. Since the acquisition of 
Papéis Inapa in 2000 and Soporcel in 2001, the company became the number one producer of 
bleached eucalyptus kraft pulp (BEKP) in Europe and one of the leading producers of UWF 
paper. This market leadership was consolidated in 2009 with the inauguration of the new 
Setúbal paper mill, which has proven to be one of the most efficient paper mills worldwide. 
These high levels of efficiency are one of the group’s trademarks and a key source of stability.  
The company also has its own forest and energy generation departments.  
The forest segment is responsible for 
managing all the company’s woodland 
assets, which are over 120 thousand 
hectares, 74% of which are eucalyptus. 
Although it represents only 0,2% of the 
company’s external revenues, this 
division’s intersegment sales and services 
are 13% of the total revenues. This shows 
the importance of this segment, which has 
the role to produce the raw materials for 
pulp production. 
The energy segment represents 12,1% 
of the group’s total revenues and 3% of 
Portugal’s total energy generation. This 
is very notable since it is not the company’s core business. The division is able to feed the 
energy required for all the company’s operations and still export significant amounts of 
energy. 
These two segments can be viewed as support segments for the company’s core business of 
pulp and paper production, representing 87,7% of the company’s total revenues (79,9% paper 
and 7,8% pulp). 
The existence of these two segments is very important when explaining the company’s 
stability:  
Being a commodity company, Portucel is subject to a significant volatility associated with 
economic cycles. However, since it produces its own raw materials and energy, it is less subject 
to market volatilities and cycles regarding raw material and energy prices. This, in turn, 
minimizes the impact of the pulp and paper sales price volatility, which can be affected by 
economic cycles.  
Currently, the Portucel Soporcel Group has an installed capacity for 1,6 million tons/year of 
paper, 1,4 million tons/year of pulp and 2,5 TWh/year of electric energy. 
 
Figure 3: 2012 Portucel Revenues by Segment (Source: Semapa 
Interim Report 2012 & own calculations) 
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6.2. Secil Group 
The second largest company in the Semapa group, which was fully acquired by Semapa during 
the year of 2012, was founded in 1925.  
Its operations started with the Outão cement plant in Setúbal, which was created by 
Companhia de Cimentos de Portugal in 1906. This factory was later sold to Companhia Geral 
de Cal e Cimento, who in turn rented it to Secil 
(the name stands for Sociedade de 
Empreendimentos Comerciais e Industriais, 
Lda.). In 1930 Secil and Companhia Geral de 
Cal e Cimento merged with a group of Danish 
companies. 
The capacity of the plant gradually increased 
from 10.000 tons/year in 1906, to 1 million 
tons/year in 1972. At this time Secil was the 
largest cement manufacturer in Portugal. 
After the revolution in Portugal in 1974, the 
whole cement industry was nationalized in 
1975. During this period the old plant is shut 
down and a new one is opens using dry process kiln, instead of the old wet process. This plant 
had centralized and computerized controls and reduced production costs. 
In 1994 the State sells off its holdings in the 
Cement industry to Semapa and later that year 
Secil acquires CMP, a cement company that 
owned two cement plants in Portugal. 
In the year 2000 Secil started its international 
expansion with the acquisition of Société des 
Ciments de Gabès, a Tunisian cement company 
with a plant with capacity for 1,1 million 
ton/year. Until 2004 Secil expanded into 
Lebanon and Angola.  
Currently Secil has a total capacity of 6,85 million tons/year. Portugal still dominates its 
operations with 55% of the production capacity. However, Tunisia (20%) and Lebanon (18%) 
still have a very significant weight on the company’s productions. 
6.3. Supremo Cimentos, S.A. 
Supremo Cimentos, S.A. is the most recent acquisition of Semapa, who purchased 50% of the 
company during the first trimester of 2012.  
Figure 5: 2012 Secil Revenues by Geography (Source: 
Semapa Interim Report 2012 & own calculations) 
Figure 4: 2012 Secil Revenues by Segment (Source: Semapa 
Interim Report 2012 & own calculations 
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Supremo Cimentos, S.A. is a Brasillian cement company with a 350 thousand ton/year capacity 
plant in Santa Catarina. It also produces concrete and aggregates, similarly to Secil. Supremo is 
undergoing a capacity expansion plant with the construction of a new plant in Adrianópolis, 
Paraná. The new plant is expected to have nearly 1,5 million tons/year capacity and should 
start operating in 2014. 
During the first trimester of 2012 the company reported nearly 10 million € in sales with a 0,5 
million € EBITDA. This would represent yearly revenues below 2% of Semapa’s total group 
revenues. However, the company’s high growth potential and predicted capacity expansion 
should be taken into account when valuing Semapa. 
6.4. ETSA Group 
ETSA is an environmental company that resulted from the merger of SEBOL and ITS, two 
market leaders in the market of collection and processing of animal waste, in 1997. Since then, 
ETSA has focused on the recovery, storage, transportation, disposal and revaluation of animal 
by-products and other food by-products. 
The ETSA group was incorporated in Semapa by the end of 2008 and is 96% owned by that 
holding. It reported 33 million € in revenues in 2011, representing roughly 1,6% of Semapa’s 
total. Taking into account the company’s level of impact in the group’s total value, its historic 
cash flows, its growth perspectives and plans and its considerable, but fairly stable, growth 
rates, the ETSA group will be valued only with a multiples approach. 
7. Macroeconomic scenario 
Since the outburst of the subprime crisis in the USA at the end of 2007, the worldwide growth 
has been erratic. Data from The Economist (see Figure 6) reveals that the worldwide real GDP 
growth started plumitting in 2007, reaching negative values in 2009. 
Figure 6: GDP Growth Forecast 1997-2017 (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [October 17th 2012]) 
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Since 2009 there was a fast comeback until 2011. However, after that year a second crisis 
seemed to affect Europe, reaching negative values again in 2012. This European crisis was 
most notable in the EU15, compared to the new members (see Appendix 2 & Appendix 3). The 
southern European countries were particulary affected by this crisis, namely Portugal. 
At this date, prospects for the coming years are positive. The same source forecasts world GDP 
growth averages at market exchange rates of 2,5% in 2013 and 2,9% in 2014, as opposed to 
the 2,2% witnessed in 2012 (see Appendix 4).  
Europe’s forecasts are also positive when compared to the -0,1% GDP decline in 2012. The 
Economist forecasts a modest 0,5% growth in 2013, 1,3% in 2014 and then a stable 1,4%  for 
the following three years, 2015-2017 (see Appendix 4). 
In the Portuguese case, the expected average real GDP growth rate is 0,5% until 2020 and 2,1% 
from there on after until 2030. Portugal’s recent lack of labour productivity and external 
competitiveness in traditional export sectors has lead to a small growth potential. In the long 
run, Portugal should regain some competitiveness thanks to the current process of internal 
devaluation. In any case, the forecasted long run GDP growth rate of 2,1% reflects that 
Portugal will still have to face many competitors for foreign direct investment. 
 
Figure 8: Western Europe growth and inflation forecast 2008-2017 (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
[October 17th 2012]) 
Inflation in Europe is expected to continue falling in 2013 and then return to the 2% level in 
2014 and remain fairly stable until 2017. In the same way, the worlwide inflation of 3,4%  in 
2012 is expected to remain fairly stable until 2017, with the OECD countries registering a 
stable inflation rate of 2,2% (see Appendix 4). 
Figure 7: Portugal growth and productivity forecast 2012-2030 (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [August 
4th 2012]) 
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After recovering in 2010 from an historical decline of 11,7% in 2009, world trade growth has 
been falling until 2012. However, expectations are that in 2013 it will pick up the pace and 










The financial crisis also made an impact on the economy through the access to external debt. 
Short-term interest rates plunged in 2007 from values around 4% to under 1% in 2009. The 
measure was intended to encourage consumption and investment, in order to stimulate the 
slow economy. However, the increased risk defaults and unstable economic situation lead to 
an increase of bank spreads that offset the previous interest rate declines. 
This outcome is visible for both the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve – in this 
case reaching 0,1%. The effect was global, with the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan 
both reaching values below 0,5% (see Appendix 5 & Appendix 6) 
This effect has remained from 2009 to 2012, even 
decreasing further in Europe, but the expectation is that 
it will reverse after 2013, growing steadily until 2017 all 
around the world. 
8. Valuation of Semapa 
Semapa will be valued using the sum of the parts 
method. This means that each of the companies in the 
holding will be valued separately.  
For Portucel and Secil, because they represent over 
Figure 9: World Trade growth forecast 2008-2017 (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [October 17th 2012]) 
Figure 10: Main Policy Interest Rates 1997-2017 (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [October 17th 2012]) 
Figure 11: Semapa Revenues by Company 2012 (Source: 
Semapa Interim Report 2012 & own calculations) 
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97,5% of the total revenues, the valuation will be more thorough. An industry overview will be 
conducted for both companies, followed by a multiple based valuation and a discounted cash 
flow valuation, using the WACC method. 
For ETSA and Supremo, which together represent only 2,5% of the total revenues, the 
valuation will be based on market values, adjusted by simple assumptions if appropriate. 
The significant changes that happened in the company during the year of 2012 will have a 
relevant impact on its future and therefore on the present valuation. However, the effect of 
these changes was only incorporated in the half-year report of 2012, and only affecting the 2nd 
trimester (51% of Secil in the 1st trimester and 100% of Secil in the 2nd trimester in 2012 vs 51% 
of Secil in 2011).  
This means that there is no full-year, or even half-year, information of the companies’ 
accounts considering the presence of Supremo and 100% of Secil on the consolidated report. 
Considering that the valuation will be based on a sum of the parts approach, any impact of the 
acquisitions of Supremo and Secil will be accounted for in their own valuation.  
For these reasons, the earnings forecasts will be based on information from previous full-year 
reports. Nevertheless, all new information obtained after the 2011 annual report until this 
date (including the 2012 half-year reports) will be considered and the valuations will be 
adjusted accordingly. 
8.1. Portucel Soporcel Group 
 
This company represents 73% of the total Semapa group revenues and for this reason it is the 
main driver of the company’s value. Comparable historical data from the company’s annual 
reports date back to 2004, when a transition from the Portuguese accounting rules to the IFRS 
took place. A key to estimating Portucel’s value correctly is the analysis of the pulp & paper 
industry and consequent growth forecasts. 
8.1.1. Industry Overview 
Paper is the final output of Portucel’s mills. Until the final uncoated wood free (UWF) paper is 
produced, wood is consumed, along with fuel and electricity, to produce pulp, which in turn is 
consumed, along with more fuel and electricity, to produce the UWF paper. 
Thus, the main profitability drivers in the pulp & paper industry are energy costs (electricity 
and fuel), wood price, pulp demand/price and paper demand/price. 
8.1.1.1. Energy 
Portucel produces more electricity than it consumes and, as such, still manages to make some 
money from it. Yet, the price at which it sells electricity is fixed but the price at which it buys 
can change. For this reason electricity price fluctuations affect Portucel’s profitability in the 
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energy segment, however, this impact is very slight because it represents only a variation on a 
small margin on the electricity segment. 
Fuel costs, however, impact Portucel’s margins directly. Fuel prices in Portugal have been 
raising very quickly (140% increase from 2000 to 2011) despite the crisis scenario. We can see 
that the growth slowed down when the crisis hit in 2007, but it skyrocketed again in 2011 
when the economy recovered some. Portugal, despite having a low GDP per capita compared 
to the European average, has very high gasoline prices compared to its European peers (see 
Appendix 7).  
 
Figure 12: Fuel Prices in Portugal 1991-2010 in € (Source: GIZ - German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development) 
The tendency for the crude oil on the world market (red benchmark line), was very similar to 
Portugal’s. It grew steadily from 2002 to 2006, dropping with the crisis in 2007 and recovering 
quickly in recent years. For the short-term, expectations for fuel prices are that they will keep 
the upward trend. However, the growth rates verified in the last decade and especially in the 
last 2-3 years aren’t sustainable. 
8.1.1.2. Wood 
Regarding wood, Portucel has a similar risk protection as it does for electricity. Portucel has its 
own forest division, which produces wood internally and uses it mostly for its own activities. In 
this case, however, Portucel’s wood production isn’t enough to fully finance its pulp & paper 
activities. Therefore it must acquire some wood externally.  
So, if the demand for wood increases for reasons other than increased demand for UWF paper, 
this could lead to wood costs increasing without a corresponding increase in paper costs. This 
could, thus reduce paper margins and decrease free cash flow estimates. 
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Figure 13: CEPI Wood Consumption by Origin 2000-2011 (Source: Eurostat) 
CEPI is the Confederation of European Paper Industries, and provides data on the pulp & paper 
industry for European countries, which can be used as a benchmark for Portucel. According to 
Eurostat’s early 2012 data, wood consumption in these European countries is mainly from 
domestic origin and over 100 M tons in total.  
The trend in wood consumption follows the macroeconomic scenario, as expected. It started a 
slump in 2007 that peaked in 2009 and started recovering thereafter. It can also be noted that 
during crisis years, CEPI countries tended to increase their dependence on domestic wood, in 
detriment of imported wood. 
8.1.1.3. Pulp 
Pulp is a global commodity. It can be used to produce several kinds of paper. The demand for 
pulp is a function of paper demand, pulp capacity and wood costs. 
In the case of bleached hardwood kraft pulp (BHKP) prices, a cycle is clearly visible with a low 
peak in mid-2009 (>40% price drop) of around 350 €/ton and an upward peak of nearly 750 
€/ton in mid-2010. This cycle is noticeable across all kinds of pulp (see Appendix 8) and reflects 
a significant reduction in paper and board demand in 2007 and 2008 (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 14: BHKP Pulp Prices 2007-2012 in €/ton (Source: FOEX [23rd October 2012]) 
Pulp prices are a function of paper demand, wood costs and pulp capacity. We have seen how 
the first correlates the cycle in pulp prices. Regarding wood costs, naturally there was a 
decrease due to the reduced wood consumption, which further explains the pulp prices 
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downturn in 2008-2009. As for pulp capacity, we can see below that during this period Europe 
had overcapacity for pulp production, which also partly explains the price reduction.  
 
Figure 15: Number of CEPI Pulp Mills and Pulp Production 1991-2011 (Source: Eurostat) 
This resulted was a severe reduction in pulp production and a reduction of the number of pulp 
mills in CEPI countries. However, the trend in pulp production in the mid-term has been for 
growth, despite the big downturn in recent years. 
With the recovery of paper demand and wood costs, pulp prices have recovered to values 
above what they were pre-crisis and are expected to remain fairly stable in the 500-600 € 
range. 
In the case of pulp price and demand, Portucel’s risk exposure was significantly reduced with 
the introduction of the new paper mill in Setúbal in 2009 since more pulp is used internally and 
less is available to sell externally. This means that Portucel’s exposure to pulp prices, although 
present, was reduced significantly. 
8.1.1.4. Paper 
Lastly, Portucel has to consider the volatility in paper demand and prices. This will be the most 
impacting driver on Portucel’s cash flows. A reduction in demand because of a new 
technology, for example iPads, would create a decline in paper prices that would directly 
impact Portucel’s results. 
In the CEPI countries the trend in the mid-term has followed the macroeconomic pattern, but 
with more significant growth, less volatility and a lower impact in the crisis years compared to 
pulp. Paper production has grown faster than consumption, meaning that the ratio between 
exports/imports is increasing. 
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Figure 16: CEPI Paper & Board Production and Consumption 1991-2011 (Source: Eurostat) 
The trend for A4 B-copy printing paper prices has been similar to that of BHKP pulp, although 
with a much lower variance. It reached its lowest point of 760 €/ton in early 2010 (<15% price 
drop), with a lag of 9 months compared to pulp, and its high-point was in late 2011, reaching 
nearly 880€/ton.  
 
Figure 17: A4 B-copy Paper Prices 2007-2012 in €/ton (Source: FOEX [23rd October 2012]) 
Although the impact in A-4 B-copy paper prices was very noticeable in 2009, if we look at the 
prices for the main types of paper during this crisis period we can see that the impact was not 
very significant and that paper prices, even during a severe crisis, are very stable (<15% price 
drop). 
Figure 18: Paper Prices 2008-2009 in €/ton (Source: FOEX) 
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Unlike pulp, paper prices didn’t suffer a significant drop in late-2011/early-2012. If we add to 
this the fact that the variance, even during the crisis period, is not significantly pronounced, we 
can conclude that in general terms, paper prices, which are the main source of potential 
instability for Portucel, are actually very stable. Expectations for the mid-term are that paper 
prices will continue their historical steady annual growth (1%-3%). 
This lower variance in the paper prices put together with Portucel’s intrinsic control of 
electricity, wood and pulp prices, through vertical integration, results in a very good safeguard 
to the main sources of risk exposure for the firm. 
8.1.2. Discounted Cash Flow 
Since Portucel represents the most substantial portion of Semapa’s total value, a more 
detailed analysis is necessary on future prospects and expansion plans, along with a clear 
understanding on their current situation, in order to make accurate assumptions. 
The most recent relevant event in Portucel was the opening of the new factory in Setúbal in 
2009. That represented a 27% revenue increase between 2009 and 2010. Last year, with the 
factory installed, running and operating at nearly full capacity the revenue still grew 7,4%. This 
growth was mainly due to the increased production of UWF paper in the new mill, which 
reached 97% capacity by the end of 2011, along with an increase in paper prices and increased 
energy production and sales (20% increase). 
In the first semester of 2012, the sales volume of paper increased by 3%, despite Europe’s 
general contraction in paper consumption of -3,5%, increasing Portucel’s market share. Prices 
remained fairly stable, with an average PIX Copy-B paper price reduction of 0,5% in the period. 
This fact pledges for the company’s growth stability, even in adverse economic situations. 
Regarding the pulp division, production increased in 2011 but sales decreased by 16%. This is 
explained by a decrease in BHKP pulp prices, but also by a higher internal integration of pulp in 
the production of paper, tendency that continued during the first semester of 2012. 
Costs, however, suffered an unfavorable increase in 2011. The main reasons for this increase 
were the payroll increase, owing to a necessary increase of the number of employees, and the 
increase of wood and energy costs. 
In this scenario, the EBITDA was 3,8% lower than in 2010 and the net income was 196,3 M €, 
6,8% below the previous year. 
The company’s investments were, naturally, 62,5% lower than in 2010. This is explained by the 
conclusion of the new Setúbal mill. The next investment plans of the company are in the 
forestry segment. The company plans to continue its vertical integration strategy, producing its 
own raw materials for paper and pulp both in Portugal and abroad. The acquisition of 179 
thousand hectars in Mozambique for wood production was a clear step in this direction. 
However, there is no prediction for a sudden major investment as the construction of a new 
mill. 
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Besides vertical integration, the company is pursuing an international strategy. In 2011, 
exportations already represented 95% of the company’s sales, selling in 115 countries 
throughout the five continents. The tendency to spread out the sales is reflected in the 
consistent reduction of share in Europe (80% in 2009, 73% in 2010, 69% in 2011). However, 
Europe still represents the lion’s share of Portucel’s sales. 
8.1.2.1. Revenues Assumptions 
The company’s revenues will be determined mainly the selling prices and quantities of each of 
their products. However, the production capacity and the capacity utilization rate of their 
factories will also play an important role. 
Pulp and Paper 
Production capacity for paper is generally constant. Changes are the result of new factory 
openings, which represent a major change in capacity. Pulp on the other hand, is subject to 
small production capacity increases annually. This is the result of minor improvements to the 
existing factories, which upgrade the production capacity by a small margin. This margin, over 
the last 5 years averaged a growth rate of 1,7%. 
 
Figure 19: Portucel Pulp and Paper Capacity in 1000 tons (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
If we assume that this average pulp production capacity growth rate will remain stable until 
2017 and that no new paper mills will be opened during this period, Portucel’s paper capacity 
will stabilize at 1585 tons/year and the pulp production capacity will grow from the 1440 
tons/year verified in 2011 to 1590 tons/year in 2017.  
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Figure 20: Portucel Pulp and Paper capacity utilization in % of total capacity (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & 
own calculations) 
Portucel’s capacity utilization is very high for both pulp and paper, which is one of the 
company’s most renowned attributes. The company’s capacity utilization regarding paper has 
followed an upward trend since 2003 when it was 88%. There was an abrupt reduction in 
2010, which is explained by the opening of the new mill, which naturally didn’t perform at full 
capacity immediately. However, in 2011 the utilization rate was already 98%, the same rate it 
had in 2009. In the future, it can’t be expected that the factories keep upgrading their 
utilization rate at the same speed they have in the past, because they are already very close to 
full capacity. A slow improvement up to 99% in 2017 is a more realistic scenario considering 
the increased difficulty of improving utilization rates nearing 100%. 
As for pulp, the capacity utilization rates have been fairly stable. They have reached 100% in 
2006 and decreased until 2009, following the slower demand pattern. In 2010 and 2011 the 
utilization rate grew back up to 99%, recovering alongside the demand. In this case, taking into 
consideration that fluctuations are small, even during the crisis, I will assume for the future the 
average value of the entire cycle (98,5%). 
Portucel has always managed to keep high capacity utilization levels for consecutive years and 
with a tendency to increase. Nevertheless, the levels of inventories of finished goods at year-
end have been erratic, with no clear tendency or correlation with productions and demand. 
The fact is that this is an industry that doesn’t suffer from shelf life restrictions. For this reason, 
it is worthwhile to maximize the factory lines’ occupation regardless of demand. Therefore it 
will be assumed that paper production equals sales from 2012 onwards. 
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Figure 21: Pulp sales vs production 2005-2012 in M€ (Source: Portucel Annual Reports) 
Conversely, the same can’t be said for pulp, since most of the production is used internally for 
paper production. Production and sales are clearly following inverse paths, with sales declining 
systematically since 2006, despite the production’s continued upturn. It is also visible that the 
tendency increased after the new paper mills opened in 2009. While sales represented 19% of 
the total production between 2005 and 2008, they have averaged only 10% of production after 
2009. 
Since the paper production capacity isn’t expected to increase in the near future and the 
utilization rate is already close to 100% and expected to increase slowly, it is reasonable to 
assume that pulp sales/production ratio will also decrease slowly, in line with the company’s 
paper mills’ need for pulp. In the first semester of 2012, pulp sales were 8% of production.  
The prices for both paper and pulp have followed the economic trend with a pronounced 
downturn in 2009 and a quick recovery in 2010. Pulp prices followed the natural downturn 
reaction in 2011 after a +59% increase in the previous year. This downside tendency only 











Figure 22: Paper and Pulp Price Forecast in €/ton (Source: FOEX [23
rd
 October 2012] & own 
calculations) 
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Pulp prices have grown at a +3% average annual rate since 2001. However, if we consider only 
the economic cycle between 2006-2012 the average growth rate was +6,4%/year, which is 
much higher than the normal pulp price growth. In fact, prices in 2011 were 38% higher than 
the 2001-2008 average. With this in perspective, it is predictable that prices will drop to a level 
closer to what they were before. Indeed, since reaching the peak in 2010, pulp prices have 
fallen at a -5,4% annual rate until the end of Q3 2012.  
As a result, I will assume a -5,4% growth rate until 2015, when prices reach a value only 10% 
above the “pre-crisis” average prices. From then on the pulp prices will grow at the +3% annual 
rate. 
Looking at the annual growth rates of paper prices what stands out is the fact that it never 
reached double-digit changes, either positive or negative, in the 2001-2011 period. Another 
interesting fact is that paper prices seem to react later than pulp prices to trend inversions (see 
2005 and 2011). However, it follows the same general pattern as pulp prices and, non-
coincidentally, the economy. The result is that paper prices only started to fall in 2012, as a 
reaction to 2010 and 2011 unusually high growth rates (+8% and +7% respectively). 
The average paper price between 2001 and 2008 was 795€/ton. Therefore, and considering 
paper prices’ low volatility (-0,1% average variation between 2001 and 2011), the 2011 price of 
870€/ton is also unusually high. The first three trimesters of 2012 have corrected the price 
with a -2% reduction. I will assume that the market will keep correcting the price with a 
progressively lower annual decrease, until it stabilizes after 2014 and starts a slow +1% annual 
growth from there on. 
Energy 
Portucel’s energy production underwent a 200 M€ investment plan in 2009-2010. This large 
investment aimed at increasing the sector’s production capacity, particularly biomass 
originated energy. After this investment, this segment represented 11% of Portucel’s revenues 
in 2011. 
 
Figure 23: Energy Production in GWh (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Equity Valuation – Grupo Semapa 
 
   
37  
 
The energy production, which was stable from 2005 to 2008, increased +93% from 2008 to 
2011, reflecting the output of the new energy plants. The total energy production capacity is 
2.500 GWh, therefore there is still some growth potential in the existing plants. However, the 
first semester of 2012 revealed a +4% increase vs the same period in 2011. This contrasts with 
the double digit growth rates in the three previous years, suggesting the impact of the opening 
of the new plants has already been incorporated in the current productions. 
For the future there is no plan to invest in new energy plants. Therefore, any improvements 
will be done by increasing the utilization of the existing plants. It can be expected that the 
production will keep increasing at growth rates similar to that of 2012 (+4%), with a tendency 
to stabilize as it approaches the 2500 GWh capacity limit. 
 
Figure 24: Portucel Total Energy Revenue & Revenue/GWh in 1000€ (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
The revenue per GWh sold grew at a sturdy +8,1% CAGR from 2005 to 2008. In 2009 there was 
a decline due to the energy price general decrease but in the following year the revenue/GWh 
sold bounced back and grew at a +6,8 CAGR from 2009 to 2012. These high rates can be 
explained by the energy price increases, but also by a lower internal incorporation of the 
energy produced. Since the internal activities are already being fully supplied by the energy 
produced, all annual energy production increases will be channeled to external sales.  
For this reason, the annual increase in the revenue/GWh sold will be assumed to remain 
constant at a +3% annual rate. This rate is lower than the +4% registered in the first semester 
of 2012, reflecting a slower, but steady, price increase in the coming years. 
Wood and other operating revenues 
The wood segment has a minor impact on the company’s accounts as a whole. In 2011 it 
represented only 0,2% of the overall revenues. Wood is used as a by-product for Portucel’s 
other segments. Revenues aren’t the priority in this segment as it used a support segment for 
the other three segments. 
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Figure 25: Portucel Wood Sales in 1000 € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Portucel has been investing relevant amounts in this segment, which is why the wood 
produced in the first semester of 2012 alone is 22% higher than the full year 2011 wood 
production. Yet, in the first semester of 2012, despite the expressively higher wood 
production, external sales have been in line with the homologous period in 2011, which was 
the lowest in the 2005-2011 period. 
External sales have followed an erratic pattern from 2005 to 2012. However, it is notable that 
in 2011 and 2012 the value seems to have fallen compared to the previous years. A possible 
explanation for this is the increased incorporation of wood in the new mills.  
For this reason I will assume that the lower sales values after the new mills opened as the basis 
for the future projections. The company has a 3-year expansion project on this division which 
aims to increase the plant nursery capacity from the current 7,4 million plants per year to 12 
million plants per year. I assumed that the capacity will increase gradually until it reaches the 
target of 12 million per year. Furthermore, I assumed that 80% of all plant production 
increases will be sold, while the remaining 20% will be incorporated in production. 
 
Figure 26: Portucel Unallocated Revenues in 1000 € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
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The unallocated revenues have also behaved unpredictably between 2005 and 2012, with 
three periods where they weren’t accounted for at all (2006-2008). Given their unpredictability 
and lack of impact in the overall income of the company, the same assumption was made as 
for wood: other operating revenues in 2013 are the average of the 2005-2012 values and grow 
at the inflation rate from there on. 
Concluding, we can see that paper will continue to dominate the revenues of Portucel, while 
energy will increase its share progressively at the expense of pulp, which will continue to be 
integrated in the internal paper production process. 
 
Figure 27: Portucel Revenue by Segment (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
8.1.2.2. Operational Costs Assumptions 
Most of Portucel’s operational costs are directly linked to sales volumes. Therefore, the most 
significant operational cost lines (materials and services consumed and inventories sold) are 
cyclical, alike the quantities sold. However, the cyclical impact is not exactly the same as for 
revenues, since these operational costs, although directly linked to quantities sold, are not 
related to price. Thus, revenues per se are not an appropriate benchmark for operational costs 
estimation, but instead the quantities sold; which in this case, as mentioned before, are 
assumed to be the same as the quantities produced.  
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Figure 28: Portucel Operational Costs as a % of Revenues (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Although the previously mentioned operational cost lines are variable costs, the same can’t be 
said for payroll costs, which are fixed, although they might follow a similar growth pattern as 
quantities produced since, for example, the opening of the new plants will increase the 
number of employees and the production quantities hand in hand.  
Variable Costs 
Inventories sold and materials and services consumed were assumed to be allocated to pulp 
and paper as a percentage of sales. This makes sense because pulp and paper have very 
different cost structures. Paper has a much higher unit cost than pulp, which is obvious if we 
discern that pulp itself is a component of paper. 
Energy wasn’t contemplated because there is no data available about the prices and the 
quantities sold. Also, energy uses pulp residua as fuel for its own production. The same is true 
for wood and other costs; however their impact would be inconsequential. 
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tons sold 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Paper sales 986 1.004 1.031 1.016 1.103 1.313 1.342 1.387 1.561 1.561 1.561 1.569 1.569
Pulp sales 570 559 544 508 399 254 222 202 204 204 219 201 198
Sales 000'€ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Paper sales 711.959 749.625 808.448 814.103 833.530 1.068.681 1.167.926 1.187.006 1.309.680 1.290.035 1.277.135 1.290.036 1.296.486
Pulp sales 242.806 258.288 246.098 232.593 160.402 162.100 135.662 115.387 109.956 104.336 106.075 100.139 101.808
Paper 75% 74% 77% 78% 84% 87% 90% 91% 92% 93% 92% 93% 93%
Pulp 25% 26% 23% 22% 16% 13% 10% 9% 8% 7% 8% 7% 7%
Cost of inventories sold 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Paper 261.828 266.140 321.996 390.973 406.861 449.103 519.881 553.521 637.880 651.475 664.550 683.504 696.909
Pulp 89.294 91.700 98.019 111.703 78.295 68.121 60.388 55.708 56.808 58.041 63.739 59.403 59.720
Cost of inventories sold per ton 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Paper 266 265 312 385 369 342 387 399 409 417 426 436 444
Pulp 157 164 180 220 196 268 272 276 279 284 291 296 302
Cost of materials consumed 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Paper 220.627 223.244 221.101 219.177 242.315 292.535 321.009 341.781 393.869 402.264 410.337 422.041 430.318
Pulp 75.242 76.920 67.305 62.620 46.630 44.372 37.287 34.398 35.077 35.838 39.356 36.679 36.875
Cost of materials consumed per ton 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Paper 224 222 214 216 220 223 239 246 252 258 263 269 274
Pulp 132 138 124 123 117 175 168 170 172 176 179 183 186
 
Figure 29: Paper and Pulp as a % of Revenues (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Sales quantities are a better benchmark than revenues when estimating variable operational 
costs because the costs are not affected by the sales price, contrarily to revenues. Instead, the 
variable costs will be affected by the quantities sold and the mix of products sold and the 
associated unit costs.  
Sales value % was used to allocate the costs between the two products. Then, based on the 
quantities sold, a cost per ton was computed. The assumption was that these costs per ton 
along with the quantities produced will be the drivers of the variable costs for the forecasted 
period. 
Figure 30: Variable Costs Forecast in 1000 € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
The growth rate for the cost per ton sold was assumed to be the annual sales share variation, 
plus the inflation rate. This means that the real cost per ton of pulp sold will decrease annually 
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along with the pulp’s sales share decrease, while the real cost per ton of paper sold will 
increase at the yearly rate of sales share increase.  
The rationale behind this calculation is based on the premise that paper has higher variable 
costs than pulp. Thus, when the mix of products sold involves higher percentages of paper, the 
cost of each unit sold will be higher. 
Payroll Costs 
The main driver of payroll costs is, naturally, the number of workers. Before the opening of the 
new paper mills and energy mills in 2009 the tendency was to reduce the number of 
employees. Obviously though, the opening of the new mills forced a sudden increase in the 
number of employees. However, in 2011 with the implementation of the LEAN project, which 
was designed to boost operational efficiency. One of the main aims of this project is “to cut 
costs in operational areas, in respect of processes, equipment and people”. For this reason, the 
number of employee reduced -2% in 2011 and -0,5% in the first semester of 2012. 
 
 
Figure 31: Portucel number of workers (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
This project should be in place for the entire explicit period and therefore the number of 
employees and the employee related costs should keep reducing. Regarding the number of 
workers I have assumed for the full year of 2013 a decrease of the same magnitude as the one 
verified in the first semester of 2012. In 2014 I assumed a smaller decrease, since the 
“dispensable” employees should be cut immediately and after that the reductions have to be 
surgical. From this point on I assumed a slow increase of the number of employees reflecting a 
natural growth in the company size. 
The payroll costs for 2012 were computed as the average cost per employee over the 2005-
2011 period, multiplied by the estimated number of workers. For the remaining of the 
forecasted period, the average cost per worker was assumed to reduce at a 1% annual rate, as 
a result of the LEAN program. 
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Other Costs and Losses 
Given the unpredictable nature of these costs, the fact that it includes both variable and fixed 
costs and their low volatility and significance, I have decided to compute them based on the 
2005-2011 average. The growth for the explicit period will be the inflation rate. 
Provisions 
Provisions have followed an extremely unpredictable path. They have had a historically 
unstable pattern and there is not enough information about it. The most relevant values since 
2005 were provisions for tax claims related to VAT contingencies outside of Portugal, while 
legal provisions have a small impact. The value reported as “other” provisions isn’t well 
detailed in the company’s report, but relates to “provisions for risks with other public entities 
which may originate cash outflows in the future”. 
Additionally, if we valuate a period (longer than a year) of time, the value included in 
provisions for one year will be reversed in another. For these reasons, and taking into 
consideration the very low historical values for provisions, they don’t have a significant impact 
in the valuation whatsoever.  
However, an assumption must be made concerning the evolution of the provisions. The 
approach taken given the lack of information regarding each specific spike on provisions was 
that each type of provision will follow the same path as they did in the past, while the overall 
provisions account will maintain a level in line with the previous years. 
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8.1.2.3. Net Working Capital Assumptions 
 
Figure 33: Portucel Net Working Capital forecast in 1000 € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Net working capital was computed as current operational assets net of cash and current 
operational liabilities. Since 2005 until the opening of the new mills in 2009, net working 
capital followed a fairly regular path. However, in 2009 there was a strong fall and a visible 
recovery in the following year, which proceeded until 2012. 
For estimation purposes, I considered that each of the net working capital items, from 2012 
onwards, followed a percentage of revenues.  
Inventories, since 2005, have had a very close connection to revenues, ranging from 11%-13%, 
with the only exception being 2008, when the value of inventories was 21% of revenues. This 
value is explained by a one-off situation caused by the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. In short, 
what happened was that due to the Olympics in Beijing, many polluting industries closed in 
China, causing speculation regarding the possible shortage of raw materials for the industry. 
For this reason the company decided to increase its stocks as a preventive measure. Given the 
uniqueness of this event, this year’s value was disregarded and the 12% average of the other 
years’ inventories/revenues ratio was used for the remaining years. 
The same approach was used for the receivables and payables accounts, representing on 
average 18% and 20% of revenues, respectively. 
8.1.2.4. Depreciations and Capital Expenditures Assumptions 
After a period of very heavy investment in increasing production capacity for pulp and energy, 
the company is now channeling its capital expenditures into trouble-shooting its plants, 
increasing efficiency and cutting costs. These, obviously, are investments of much smaller 
magnitude. 
Current Assets (000€) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Inventories 131.113 117.556 141.835 240.318 147.269 172.900 188.691 184.665 203.568 203.540 206.720 209.705 213.569
Receivables and other current assets 226.498 249.541 318.463 199.553 168.191 212.840 242.257 271.673 299.483 299.442 304.120 308.511 314.197
State and other public entities 36.132 24.683 35.211 47.070 51.477 32.228 54.684 40.212 40.212 40.212 40.212 40.212 40.212
Total 483.264 660.678 880.674 709.490 419.486 551.926 753.064 680.362 707.372 687.601 775.757 746.764 719.946
Current Liabilities
Payables and other current liabilities (182.464) (187.859) (259.882) (248.702) (272.530) (264.839) (284.893) (303.211) (334.249) (334.204) (339.425) (344.326) (350.672)
State and other public entities (27.737) (40.384) (81.607) (38.912) (55.578) (49.329) (79.673) (53.317) (53.317) (53.317) (53.317) (53.317) (53.317)
Total (288.440) (238.706) (402.345) (303.708) (659.420) (405.418) (528.652) (618.361) (423.478) (623.432) (428.653) (433.555) (639.900)
Non-cash Net Working Capital 183.542 163.537 154.020 199.328 38.829 103.799 121.065 140.022 155.696 155.674 158.310 160.785 163.990
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Figure 34: Portucel CAPEX and Depreciations 2005-2011 in 1000 € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports) 
For this reason, the 900 M€ invested between 2008 and 2010, which represent the investment 
planned for the new paper and energy plants, will be removed from the basis period for 
estimation. On the other hand, the value for the first semester of 2012 will be considered for 
estimation, in order to widen the relevant period. 
By averaging the CAPEX outside the 2008-2010 period, we obtain 42.346 €. If we consider that 
the value reported in the first semester of 2012 (20.104 €) will be the same in the second 
semester, we get a value of 40.208 €, which is consistent with the value in the previous years. 
Thus, the value considered for the explicit period will be the average between 2005-2007 and 
2011-2012, growing at the inflation rate. 
 
Figure 35: Depreciations as a % of Non-Current Assets (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Regarding depreciations, we can see that they seem to have a close relation with non-current 
assets, averaging 5,5% of the total non-current assets value. However, this assumption would 
be too general and possibly misleading.  
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Furthermore, if we observe the annual change in every line of the non-current assets, we can 
see that the only one that had annual variations representing more than 1% of the total non-
current assets since 2005, was the Property, Plant and Equipment line (see Appendix 9). For 
this reason, this will be, by far, the key driver of the total non-current assets value. 
Taking a closer at Portucel’s non-current assets we can see that goodwill hasn’t changed since 
2004. Therefore it will be assumed to remain constant from here on, as it has in the past, since 
there is no prospect of any acquisitions that may affect the company’s goodwill. 
Regarding the biological assets the assumption was that they would grow in line with the 
expansion project mentioned in section 8.1.2.1 (wood revenues). Besides the growth required 
to increase the plant nursery capacity from 7,4 million to 12 million plants per year in 3 years’ 
time, the previous years’ biological assets were assumed to be consumed at the average yearly 
rate at which they were consumed in the past (1,8%). 
For the other tangible assets, biological assets, available-for-sale financial assets, investment in 
associates and deferred taxes half-year value was used for 2012 and the assumption for the 
years in the remaining of the explicit period was that the value was the average of the 
historical period analyzed. The basis for this decision was the fact that the past evolution 











Figure 36: Portucel Property, Plant & Equipment 2005-2012 in thousands of € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & 
own calculations) 
Regarding the Property, Plant and Equipment’s value, a more detailed analysis is necessary. 
First of all, a breakdown of the value shows us a more detailed picture. It is perceptible that 
during 2008 and 2009 there were more assets under construction and, as expected, the overall 
value of buildings, equipments and other tangibles increased. Excluding this period, it is visible 
from Figure 37 that the year-to-year evolution is a negative one, reflecting the yearly 
depreciations of the equipments. 
Property, Plant and Equipment annual growth 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E Average
Land 0% 0% 3% 5% 1% 5% 1% 1,9%
Buildings -10% -10% -12% 58% -1% -5% -2% -6,6%
Equipments and other tangibles 2% -6% -6% 59% 11% -5% -3% -3,6%
Figure 37: Portucel Property, Plant & Equipment annual growth 2005-2012 (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
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Regarding the assets under construction, there isn’t a linear growth. Therefore I will assume 
the average value of the period, excluding 2008 and 2009. Contrariwise, land has had a very 
linear growth, increasing every year since 2007 and averaging +1,9% since 2005, which will be 
assumed as the annual growth rate for the future as well. 
The equipments and buildings behave differently since they are depreciated every year and 
were affected by the 2008-2009 investment. As can be seen in Figure 37, which is considering 
only the relevant period, the buildings’ value was decreasing at a constant -10% yearly rate 
before 2009. After that it has reduced at an average -3% per year (2010-2012), which will be 
assumed to be the rate for the explicit period. 
The equipments value has behaved more irregularly year-to-year, however it averaged roughly 
-3,5% annually both before and after the investment plan. Thus, this will be assumed to be the 
equipments and other tangibles’ annual growth rate until 2017. 
 
Figure 38: Portucel annual depreciation rate 2005-2012 (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Having the estimated Property, Plant and Equipment values, discriminated by category, we can 
estimate the corresponding depreciation rates. The logical approach is to use the average 
historical value verified during the last cycle. These rates can be used for buildings and 
equipments, however, other tangibles and intangibles’ depreciation rates can’t be directly 
computed this way. Regarding intangible asset depreciations, the value was constant between 
2007 and 2010 and the value in 2011 was reversed in 2012. Therefore, the 2007-2010 value 
will be considered to remain constant for the future as well. As for other tangibles’ 
depreciations, given their irregular pattern, the lack of data concerning them and the 
unpredictability of the direction of their growth, an average of the entire cycle will be assumed 










Depreciation rate 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E Average
Buildings 7% 7% 8% 6% 5% 3% 3% 5,6%
Equipment 6% 6% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 7,6%
Figure 39: Portucel CAPEX and Depreciations forecast in 1000 € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
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8.1.2.5. Debt and interest Assumptions 
Portucel’s interest bearing liabilities totaled 731 M€ by the end of 2011. This contrasts with a 
peak in 2010. This peak, along with 2005, represents the issue of bonds. In 2005, Portucel 
issued a total of 350 M€ in bonds, in two separate issues: 150 M€ maturing in October 2012 
and 200 M€ maturing in May 2013. In 2010 it issued another two different sets of bonds worth 
100 M€ each, one expiring in January 2015 and the other in the following month. 
 
Figure 40: Portucel Interest Bearing Liabilities in M€ (Source: Portucel Annual Reports) 
As of the last available report, the 2012 interim report, the outstanding bonds accounted for a 
total of 550 M€ (see Figure 41). However, in October 2012 one of these loans, worth 150 M€ is 
expiring. For this reason, we must wonder how Portucel will repay this loan.  
 
Figure 41: Portucel Bond Loans Outstanding as of June 30th 2012 (Source: Portucel Interim Report 2012) 
Although it has 179 M€ worth in “other treasury applications”, I will assume that the company 
will turn to the markets to finance the bond payout. In fact, this was the strategy undertaken 
in 2010, when the last bond loan was repayed. Indeed, in that occasion Portucel repaid a 325 
M€ by reissuing bonds worth 200 M€ and obtaining 115 M€ worth in banks loans. The 
remaining 10 M€ were paid using cash. 
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Figure 42: Portucel Bond Loans vs Banks Loans as a % of Total Interest Bearing Liabilities forecast (Source: 
Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
If we look at the company’s historic loan structure, we can see that bonds are predominant, 
although that tendency seems to be reducing in recent years. 
With this in mind, I will assume that the company will keep the ratio of bonds/bank loans 
above, but closer to, 1. This means that the percentage of bond loans over total loans will 
remain above 50%, although lower than the 2005-2011 period average of 85%. 
That being said, the assumption will be that in 2012 and 2013, when the bond loans worth 150 
M€ and 200 M€ expire, Portucel will issue new bond loans worth the same nominal value, with 
a 5 year maturity and indexed to the Euribor 6m rate. In 2015, when two 100 M€ bond loans 
mature, I will consider that the company issues 100 M€ in bonds and 200 M€ in bank loans to 
rebalance the debt level and structure. This bank loan is assumed to be in line with the 
previous bank loans: 12 years maturity, semi-annual installments and an interest rate indexed 
to the Euribor 6m. 
 
Figure 43: Portucel Interest Bearing Liabilities foreacast in M€ (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
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The existing bank loans were obtained in 2009 and 2010 and are well detailed in the 
company’s 2011 annual report. The table below shows the key details of the outstanding bank 
loans as of 2012: 
 
Figure 44: Portucel Outstanding Bank Loans as of June 30th 2012 (Source: Portucel Interim Report 2012 & own 
calculations) 
The repayment plan can be computed in detail and the assumption will be that the company 
uses its available cash and other treasury applications to repay debt. 
 
Figure 45: Euribor 6m forecast (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit & own calculations) 
The interest rates are indexed to the Euribor 6m. This rate was estimated using annual 
averages for past values and the same growth pattern expected by The Economist Intelligence 
Unit for the main policy interest rates, applied by the European Central Bank (see Figure 10 
and Appendix 5), for the explicit period. The Euribor 6m rate is thus expected to start 
recovering in 2014, growing consistently until 2017. 
The interest rate for Portucel will be the Euribor 6m plus the estimated default spread for the 
company. Assuming a BBB rating, which is in line with the BESI research, and using 
Damodoran’s model (see Appendix 10) to estimate the associated spread, we can add the 2,5% 
spread to each of the estimated annual Euribor 6m, reaching the final cost of debt. 
 
Figure 46: Portucel Interest Rate forecast (Source: Portucel Annual Reports, BESI research paper, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit & own calculations) 
Issue date 2009 2010 2010
Amount 65.000€ 30.000€ 85.000€
Maturity 10 11 14
Installments 4.643 1.667 3.542
Interest rate Euribor 6m + variable spread Euribor 6m + fixed spread Euribor 6m + fixed spread
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
2,22% 3,19% 4,31% 4,15% 1,52% 1,07% 1,64% 0,92% 0,62% 1,23% 2,46% 3,08% 3,70%
Euribor 6m
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8.1.2.6. Other Assumptions 
Having projected all the major components of the income statement for the explicit period, 
there are still some details to be outlined. 
The effective income tax rate for 2013-2017 was estimated based on the historical difference 
between expected and effective income tax rates. Since 2005, effective income tax was -3,4% 
lower than the expected income tax rate. This differential will be applied over the 31,5% 
income tax rate set for 2012, yielding a 28,1% effective income tax rate. The same rate was 
assumed for 2013. For the 2014-2017 period it was assumed that the income tax rate will be 
reduced back to the 29% of 2011 and thus the effective income tax rate for this period will be 
25,6%. 
The Other Operating Income line refers to a number of gains non-related to any of the 
operational segments of the company. Such gains include gains on the sale of non-current 
assets, CO₂ emission allowances and government grants, amongst other supplementary gains. 
Given the unpredictable nature of these gains and their lack of impact in the final results, the 
assumption made was that the value in 2012 is equal to the average of the 2005-2011 values 
and in the following years it grows at the inflation rate. 
The rubrics of non-controlling interests and share of gain/loss of associated companies have no 
impact on the final net profit and there is no thorough information about them. For this reason 
and given the lack of importance for the analysis at hand, it was assumed that the value will be 
constant and equal to the average of the previous periods. 
Pensions and other post-employment benefits, provisions and other non-current liabilities 
were forecasted as a function of their historical proportion of the non-current liabilities net of 
non-current interest bearing liabilities. 
Deferred tax assets don’t seem to be directly impacted by economic cycles or even operational 
profits. In fact, deferred tax assets’ main differences from year-to-year are “adjustments in 
fixed assets” and “valuation of biological assets”, which together account for about two thirds 
of the annual differences. Consequently, the assumption made was that the ratio between 
deferred tax assets and Property, Plant and Equipment + Biological Assets will remain stable 
and equal to the 2005-2012 period’s average of 2,5%. 
The dividend policy of the company has been, since 2005, to distribute between 50%-60% of 
net profit to shareholders. The only exception was 2010, when no dividends were distributed. 
In compensation, though, in 2011 the dividends distributed were 84% of the year’s net profit. 
Therefore, I will assume that the stable distribution of dividends will continue in the future 
with a yearly distribution of 55% of net profit.  
8.1.2.7. Terminal Value Assumptions 
The terminal value is computed after the explicit period of 6 years, ending in 2017. Since the 
method used is the WACC method, we must estimate the terminal Ke, Kd, tax rate and growth 
rate. 
Equity Valuation – Grupo Semapa 
 
   
52  
 
The terminal tax rate used was 25,6%, which is the estimated effective tax rate for the period 
after the post-crisis stabilization (2014-2017). 
The same reasoning was used to estimate the cost of debt. However, since the value wasn’t 
the same in the last three years of the explicit period, an average was computed, yielding a 
perpetual Kd of 5,6%. 
Regarding Ke, the formula used was: 
Ke = Rf + country risk premium + (beta * German market premium) 
In this case further assumptions are necessary. The risk-free rate was assumed to be equal to 
the German 10-year government bond yield, which is 1,37% (see Appendix 11). The country 
risk premium for Portugal is the spread vs bund, which is equal to 6,30%, while the total 
German market premium is 6%, according to Damodaran’s estimation in 2012 (see Appendix 
12). Assuming the beta of 0,89 used by Reuters (see source [December 12th 2012]: 
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=PTI.LS) to value Portucel in 2012, 
Portucel’s Ke is 13%. 
 
Figure 47: Portucel estimated Debt/Equity Ratio (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Finally, it is necessary to estimate the perpetual D/E ratio. Looking at the historical values we 
can see that debt has been fairly consistent and oscillated between 48%-54% of assets, 
averaging 50,2% through the 2005-2012. Considering the previous assumptions regarding debt 
and the companies’ historical behavior it seems fair to assume a target debt to assets ratio of 
50%. 
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Figure 48: Portucel WACC calculation (Source: Portucel Annual Reports, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, damodaran.com & own calculations) 
WACC calculation is straightforward using the formula shown in section 5.3 and yields a 
discount rate of 8,6%. Assuming a 2% perpetual growth rate, in line with the estimated 
inflation rate and slightly below the estimated worldwide GDP growth rate of 3% (see 
Appendix 4), the terminal value can be computed. By discounting the estimated FCFF for each 
of the explicit period’s years and the terminal value by the WACC rate we have the present 
values, which added up yield an enterprise value for Portucel of 2.842 M€. 
 
Figure 49: Portucel FCFF and Terminal Value calculation in thousands of € (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & 
own calculations) 
In order to compute the company’s market capitalization we must deduct the net debt and 
minority interests. From this value we can arrive at the recommended share price by dividing 
the market capitalization by the number of outstanding shares, thus yielding a final share price 
of 3,19€. 
 
Figure 50: Portucel Enterprise Value, Market Cap and Share Price calculation in thousands of €(Source: Portucel 
Annual Reports & own calculations) 
t = 25,60%
Rf  = 1,37%
Country risk premium = 6,30%
Beta = 0,89
E/V = 0,50





000€ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E Terminal
EBIT * (1-tax) 99.148 155.728 193.680 134.762 98.267 206.696 198.020 212.066 215.448 205.993 210.159 226.248 209.687
Depreciations and amortizations 132.181 77.161 70.472 77.048 111.544 121.185 124.527 104.732 101.044 97.696 94.466 91.349 88.340
(Capital Expenditures) (43.327) (20.085) (52.177) (259.968) (522.307) (95.898) (53.797) (40.208) (41.919) (42.757) (43.655) (44.572) (45.463)
(Change in Non-Cash Net Working Capital) (30.991) 20.006 9.517 (45.308) 160.499 (64.970) (17.267) (18.957) (15.674) 23 (2.637) (2.475) (3.205)
FCFF 157.010 232.810 221.492 (93.467) (151.996) 167.012 251.485 257.633 258.898 260.955 258.334 270.550 249.359 2.748.038





Total # of shares 767.500.000
Repurchased shares 22.111.382
Outstanding shares 745.388.618
Share price 3,19 €
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This share price suggests a 40% upside potential when looking at the market share price of 
2,28 € as of the closing of the 31/12/2012 trading session. From the graph below it is visible 
that in the first month of 2013 Portucel’s shares have traded above 2,60 € per share for the 
first time since October 2007, immediately before the crisis hit and the stock plummeted to its 
lowest values in 2009, until the opening of the Setúbal mill in mid-2009, which allowed the 
company’s stock value to bounce back. 
It is also evident that in mid-2011 the company’s stock suffered a new downturn, which 
continued throughout 2012, right up to the end of the year when it started a clear recovery, 
reaching its highest value since 2007. This tendency, although recent, corroborates the earlier 
assumption that 2013 will be the start of the economy’s recovery, closing a cycle that started 
in the end of 2007, lasting from 5 to 6 years. 
 
Figure 51: Portucel Share Price 2006-2013 (Source: Yahoo Finance) 
8.1.3. Multiples Valuation 
The peer group was obtained through an analysis of the European companies operating in the 
paper/forest industry, according to Damodaran’s database 
(http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/). The most current information available refers to 
data from January 2012, which is consistent with the data used from the 2011 annual report, 
although the values are in $. Whenever necessary, currency conversion rates from January 
2012 were used, although multiples and ratios’ calculation shouldn’t be affected by the 
currency used. 
These values differ slightly from the ones computed above, but the values used by Damodoran 
will be used as a comparison basis for the purpose of choosing the most appropriate peer 
group. The rationale behind this decision is that the assumptions made by Damodaran should 
be comparable between all the companies in this list. 
After selecting the broad industry and market, the first filtering criteria was to exclude every 
company with market cap below $ 500 M, which leaves the following group of companies to 
be used as a base for defining the most appropriate peer group: 
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Figure 52: European Paper/Forest Companies with Market Cap > $ 500 M in thousands of $ (Source: 
Damodaran.com) 
After a detailed analysis of each company’s operations, we can exclude SCA because it 
operates in a much broader range of industries than the remaining companies (e.g. diapers, 
feminine care, tissues, etc.). All the other companies operate in the wood processing and pulp 
and paper industry, with some small variations, such as producing paper packaging material. 
Following Goedhart, Koller and Wessels’ (2005) advice, the next triaging step was ROIC and 
expected growth. According to these criteria, M-real Oyj, Ahlstrom Oyj and UPM-Kymmene Oyj 
were excluded. The reason was that they combined very different growth expectations with 
the lowest ROIC ratios, with a significant discrepancy compared to Portucel.  
Additionally, M-real Oyj had the lowest (the only one below 50%) and more distant PBV 
compared to Portucel, there was no information on trailing and forward PE, but the current PE 
was more than double that of Portucel, the debt to Enterprise Value ratio was the highest and 
the historical growth was dramatically low. While Ahlstrom Oyj had a very discrepant forward 
PE and was, along with M-real Oyj, the only companies with negative net profit margins.  
UPM-Kymmene Oyj added to the previous arguments the fact that they were, along with 
Ahlstrom Oyj, the only companies with more than double the EV/EBIT of Portucel and 
historical growth rates that show they are not following the same trends as Portucel. 
 
Figure 53: Portucel's Peer Group in thousands of € (Source: Damodaran.com & own calculations) 
From these five companies, which were considered as Portucel’s peer group, we can compute 















revenues - Next 
2 years




M-real Oyj Finland $575,00 $1.596,20 $1.707,30 15,33 NA NA 0,46 NA 5,98 -14% -8,07% -1,55% -3,23%
Grupo Empresarial Ence SA Spain $579,60 $395,80 $891,00 6,68 8,89 9,19 0,59 6,88 3,65 7% -0,78% 9,97% 5,70%
Ahlstrom Oyj Finland $588,20 $463,80 $1.023,80 24,51 NA 35,77 0,71 19,28 4,35 4% -8,78% 4,52% -1,27%
Billerud AB Sweden $878,70 $119,00 $876,50 8,38 6,96 11,06 1,25 4,93 3,80 6% -0,47% 24,67% 9,05%
Portucel- Empresa Produtora 
de Papel SA
Portugal $1.785,90 $1.034,00 $2.553,80 6,32 6,63 7,86 0,93 7,43 4,73 7% 2,89% 15,33% 13,55%
Holmen AB Sweden $2.422,90 $902,70 $3.310,30 23,12 13,92 13,85 0,98 13,75 9,87 1% 2,74% 7,16% 6,34%
Mondi plc United Kingdom $3.407,40 $1.804,70 $5.164,20 11,34 7,18 8,63 0,72 5,47 4,41 NA -3,95% 17,84% 5,10%
Stora Enso Oyj Finland $4.832,80 $5.843,50 $9.085,10 4,70 6,50 5,67 0,60 10,36 5,76 -3% 2,26% 7,45% 4,97%
UPM-Kymmene Oyj. Finland $5.801,50 $6.138,60 $11.489,60 7,71 8,65 8,32 0,60 21,91 6,43 -1% 7,57% 3,92% 5,12%
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget, 
SCA
Sweden $10.419,90 $5.657,20 $15.650,70 12,61 12,62 11,89 1,08 11,70 6,66 1% 0,19% 11,03% 5,22%
Company Name Forward PE PBV EV/EBIT EV/EBITDA
Grupo Empresarial Ence SA 9,2 0,59 6,9 3,6
Billerud AB 11,1 1,25 4,9 3,8
Holmen AB 13,8 0,98 13,7 9,9
Mondi plc 8,6 0,72 5,5 4,4
Stora Enso Oyj 5,7 0,60 10,4 5,8
Average 9,7 0,8 8,3 5,5
Market Cap Market Cap Enterprise Value Enterprise Value
1.900.837 € 1.356.076 € 2.359.140 € 2.143.027 €
Portucel implied valuation:
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terms, we can see that the DCF valuation places Portucel at a higher market price compared to 
its peers, with the 2.8 B€ Enterprise Value and 2.4 B€ Market Capitalization not being met by 
any of the chosen multiples, using the peer group’s multiples average. 
This was expected for the PBV multiple, as it is an asset based multiple and Portucel’s value is 
in its operations and not the assets themselves. However, even using the forward PE multiple, 
the implied share price is 2,55€, which is 20% below the DCF based estimation. This could be 
the effect of using the peer multiples from 2012, when companies in general were 
undervalued due to the ongoing crisis. Another possible explanation would be the fact that the 
multiple is based in the earnings from a single year, which for a cyclical company could 
compromise the analysis. However, the fact is that using an average of the earnings 
throughout the whole cycle, in this case, doesn’t present a different conclusion. In general 
though, the PE is not the most appropriate multiple due to the company’s high depreciations 
and CAPEX. 
Concerning the EV based multiples, which yield fairly similar estimates for the company’s EV 
(both below the DCF estimated EV) the analysis is very similar. The EV/EBIT multiple yields a 
2,54€ implied share price, while EV/EBITDA implies a price of 2,25€ per share. Using an 
average of the two, the implied share price would be 2,40€ per share, 33% below the DCF 
estimated value. 
However, if we consider the highest and lowest multiples within the peer group, it becomes 
clear that the DCF estimated value of 3,19€ per share is clearly within the reasonable range of 
values, using either the forward PE or the EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA average. 
 
Figure 54: Portucel share price (Source: Damodaran.com & own calculations) 
8.2. Secil Group 
After the acquisition of the remaining shares of Secil, the Group increased its importance in 
the valuation of Semapa. However, as of the first semester of 2012, Secil’s revenues accounted 
for 20% of the whole Group, while its EBITDA represented only 9,5% of Semapa’s total EBITDA. 
Nevertheless, it still has some impact in the overall valuation and therefore a DCF valuation 
will be conducted for the Secil Group as well as a Multiples’ valuation. 
8.2.1. Discounted Cash Flow 
Considering that the Secil Group represents only about one third of Portucel, the DCF analysis 
will be more compact, focusing on the broader value drivers. 
 
 
Share Price Forward PE EV/EBIT & EV/EBITDA
Lowest 1,49 € 1,28 €
Average 2,55 € 2,40 €
Highest 3,65 € 4,59 €
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8.2.1.1. Industry Analysis 
As explained in section 6.2, the company operates mainly in the cement industry and the 
larger part of the sales are conducted in Portugal, although the aggregated international sales 
account for roughly 50% of the company’s total revenues. 
In contrast with Portucel, which operates in over one hundred countries, with very disperse 
origins of revenues, Secil has 88% of its revenues originating from four countries: Portugal, 
Lebanon, Tunisia and Angola. For this reason, the valuation and the industry analysis will be 







Figure 55: Secil Revenues by Segment 2011 (Source: Secil Annual Report 2011 & own calculations) 
The main driver of value for Secil is the cement consumption. This model will be based on the 
assumption that cement consumption per capita is indexed to GDP per capita to some extent. 
Cement consumption per capita is higher for developing countries and declines when a 
country reaches a certain level of GDP per-capita and development. The rationale is that as a 
country grows it will need more cement to build the necessary infrastructures. However, when 
a certain threshold in development is achieved not much more infrastructures are needed. At 
this point the level of cement consumption per capita will gradually decrease. 
This reasoning will be applied to estimate Secil’s operations in Portugal, Tunisia, Lebanon, 








Figure 56: Portugal & Euro Area GDP per capita in current € vs Cement Consumption per Capita in tons/1000 
people (Source: The World Bank & Secil Annual Reports) 
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Portugal’s GDP per capita, although smaller, is following roughly the same trend as the Euro 
Area’s average, growing at an average 4% since 2004. Although we can expect it to grow in the 
future, the growth will not be as high as it was in the early 90’s. The high cement consumption 
times have passed which in clear from the steep decline in the cement per capita indicator, 
despite residual population growth. Expectations are that cement consumption will continue 
to decline, although the annual decline will tend to stabilize as the economic situation does 
and as the cement consumption reaches the “maintenance only” level. 
 
Figure 57: GDP per capita in current € (Source: The World Bank) 
The situation for the remaining countries where Secil operates is significantly different. We can 
see that the GDP per capita, since 2001, has grown 7%-8% in Lebanon and Tunisia, 12% in Cape 
Verde and 25% in Angola. However, the period after 2006 must be pointed out in Lebanon, 
with an average GDP per capita annual growth of 13%. 
Cape Verde, the smallest segment of Secil, used to have a GDP per capita twice as high as 
Angola in 2001. However, nowadays, Angola’s GDP per capita is nearly double that of Cape 
Verde, having also surpassed the GDP per capita of Tunisia for the first time in 2008. 
For a better picture of each segment we can take a look at each one individually and compared 






Figure 58: Lebanon & Middle East and North Africa GDP per capita in current € vs Cement Consumption 
per Capita in tons/1000 people (Source: The World Bank & Secil Annual Reports) 
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Lebanon has grown in line with the Middle East & North African average but with smaller 
volatility. Cement consumption has gone along with the GDP per capita’s growth. However, 
the double digit growth rates in cement consumption cannot last forever, so we can expect to 
see a reduction in the growth rates for cement consumption, while they continue to grow in 
the future. 
 
Figure 59: Tunisia & Middle East and North Africa GDP per capita in current € vs Cement Consumption per Capita 
in tons/1000 people (Source: The World Bank & Secil Annual Reports) 
In Tunisia the GDP per capita growth has been more modest, averaging only 5% since 2004 and 
6% since 1989 (vs 11% in Lebanon). Tunisia’s annual growth and GDP per capita are still below 
the Middle East & North African average. For these reasons it is realistic to assume that the 
cement consumption growth will continue in the future as GDP per capita is expected to speed 
up in the future. However, the slow growth in the past and the slump in 2011 suggest that 
cement consumption growth will not be as prominent as in Lebanon. 
 
Figure 60: Angola & Sub-Saharan Africa GDP per capita in current € vs Cement Consumption per Capita in 
tons/1000 people (Source: The World Bank & Secil Annual Reports) 
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Angola has been one of the fastest growing countries in the last decade, with annual growth 
rates above 20%. Cement consumption has naturally followed that tendency. Given the 
country’s potential and the still developing nature of its construction industry, it is realistic to 
assume that the high growth rates will continue in the near future. 
 
Figure 61: Cape Verde & Sub-Saharan Africa GDP per capita in current € vs Cement Consumption in thousands of 
tons (Source: The World Bank & Secil Annual Reports) 
In Cape Verde, despite the high growth in GDP per capita, cement consumption hasn’t boomed 
yet having averaged only 4% since 2005. Expectations are that it will happen sometime in the 
future. For this reason, cement consumption should tend to increase gradually in the near 
future and boom sometime later in the future. 
 
Figure 62: Cement Consumption in thousands of tons (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
As we can see in Figure 62 above, Portugal is already in the downward trend of cement 
consumption, while Lebanon and Angola are on the rise and Tunisia and Cape Verde haven’t 
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really started to grow yet. Expectations are for these tendencies to continue for the next few 
years, while Tunisia and Cape Verde should start to grow quicker sometime in the future.  
Another aspect that can be noted from the graph is that the macroeconomic scenario also 
plays a role on cement consumption. In fact, excluding Tunisia and Cape Verde, all the 
countries had their highest growth levels in 2007, right before the crisis broke out.  
 
Figure 63: Angola Cement Consumption Annual Growth (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Angola had an average +27% increase in cement consumption between 2005 and 2008, while 
in 2009 it grew by only +4% and in 2010 the cement consumption reduced by -7%, growing 
back at +29% in 2011, when the crisis was mostly felt in Europe, deviating investment to the 
fast growing economy of Angola. 
 
Figure 64: Lebanon Cement Consumption Annual Growth (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
During the last six years, Lebanon was the country with the most constant growth rate, 
averaging +11% per year and never falling below +7%. The fastest growing year was 2007 while 
2010 displayed very good growth as well. 
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Figure 65: Portugal Cement Consumption Annual Growth (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Portugal was the only country following a downward trend, reflecting the fact it is the more 
infrastructural developed country amongst the five. Evidence indicates an evolution in line 
with the economic situation. The only year in which the cement consumption didn’t decline 
was 2007 with 2010 being the second best year. Contrariwise, cement consumption declined 
at a steeper rate in 2009 and 2011, when the crisis was more accentuated. 
 
Figure 66: Cement Consumption forecast in thousands of tons (Source: Secil Annual Reports, The World Bank & 
own calculations) 
8.2.1.2. Operational Assumptions 
Revenues 
Secil’s revenues derive from eight different products: cement, ready mixed concrete, 
aggregates, precast concrete, mortars & binders, biomass, slag and other ordinary waste. 
Cement sales represents about 77% of total revenues, while ready mixed concrete represents 
about 20%, with the remaining 3% being split amongst the other six groups of products. The 
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key driver of revenue is thus cement, with ready mixed concrete playing a secondary, but 
somewhat significant role. The remaining products are only a residual source of revenue for 
the company. 
 
Figure 67: Secil Revenues by Product 2006-2011 (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
The tendency, since 2006, has been for the cement division to increase further on, while the 
ready mixed cement is in a clear shrinking trend. Furthermore, the biomass, slag and other 
ordinary waste segments, which were the smallest of all in terms of annual revenue, have 
been sold out and will no longer be part of the company in the future.  
The “Others” group, which is now composed only by aggregates, precast concrete and mortars 
& binders, is only present in Portugal and Cape Verde, with only a small aggregates plant (5% 
of total aggregates sales). Ready mixed concrete is sold in Portugal (85% of total ready mixed 
concrete sales), Lebanon and Tunisia, while cement is sold in every country where Secil 
operates. 
Cement revenues are dependent on price and quantity sold which, obviously, varies from 
country to country. Cement consumption per country was already forecasted in 8.2.1.1. Given 
these cement consumption estimates for each country computed, I will estimate the quantities 
sold based on Secil’s historical cement market share in each country.  
 
Figure 68: Secil Cement Market Shares (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
In fact, excluding Portugal in 2011 and Cape Verde in 2008, Secil’s market shares during this 
last cycle have been very stable, within a ±3% range of the period’s average in all five 
Cement Market Share 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Estimated
Portugal 44% 45% 44% 45% 47% 53% 46%
Lebanon 24% 24% 24% 24% 21% 21% 21%
Tunisia 19% 19% 21% 20% 19% 18% 19%
Angola 10% 10% 10% 10% 7% 6% 7%
Cape Verde 17% 13% 8% 17% 18% 18% 18%
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countries. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that market shares will remain stable for the 
foreseeable future. The estimated shares were computed based on the previous years’ 
average, excluding the exceptional years (e.g. Portugal and Tunisia) or based on the most 
recent years’ average, if market shares have changed and stabilized in the latter years of the 
period analyzed (e.g. Lebanon, Angola and Cape Verde). 
By multiplying these market shares with the estimated cement consumption by market, we 
have the estimated Secil cement sales in tons (see Appendix 16). However, to forecast the 
revenues we also need to estimate the cement prices. 
 
Figure 69: Cement Market Prices per ton (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Based on data from the last economic cycle, there is strong evidence that GDP per capita and 
cement prices are tightly correlated (see Figure 70). For this reason, GDP per capita evolution 
will be used as a benchmark for cement prices and the same growth patterns will be assumed. 
Following the analysis made about GDP per capita in chapter 8.2.1.1, the same assumptions, 
regarding growth expectations and future tendencies, will be made for cement prices. 
 
Figure 70: GDP per Capita and Cement Price Annual Growth (Source: Secil Annual Reports, The World Bank & own 
calculations) 
In Portugal prices have fallen since the 2009 crisis. However, expectations are that prices will 
grow back in the future, as the economy recovers. I will assume rates between 2%-4% for the 
explicit period: smaller rates for the upcoming years as the economy recovers, higher rates in 
the following years as recovery speeds up, and finally falling back to a level only slightly above 
inflation, as it was happening before the crisis impacted the prices strongly.  
In Lebanon prices have increased at a 10% yearly rate since 2007, while GDP per capita has 
grown at an average 13% per year, having had the highest growth rates since 1998 in the 
2007-2010 period. However, these rates have reached a peak in 2008 and have been shrinking 
Cement Price 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Portugal 60 € 64 € 77 € 79 € 74 € 67 €
Lebanon NA 44 € 51 € 57 € 62 € 64 €
Tunisia 35 € 36 € 37 € 39 € 42 € 45 €
Angola 192 € 135 € 155 € 158 € 142 € 134 €
Cape Verde 200 € 207 € 145 € 112 € 104 € 108 €
GDP per Capita 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average
Portugal 15% 9% -7% -3% 5% 4%
Lebanon 11% 19% 15% 11% 7% 13%
Tunisia 12% 14% -4% 1% 2% 5%
Angola 40% 35% -13% 6% 19% 18%
Cape Verde 19% 16% 2% 3% 14% 11%
Cement Prices 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average
Portugal 7% 20% 3% -6% -9% 3%
Lebanon NA 16% 13% 9% 2% 10%
Tunisia 3% 2% 7% 6% 8% 5%
Angola -30% 15% 2% -10% -5% -6%
Cape Verde 4% -30% -23% -8% 4% -11%
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since, reaching their lowest in 2011 for both cement prices and GDP per capita. There are 
prospects of continued growth in Lebanon, however the annual rates should not be as 
flamboyant as they have been. I will assume a 4%-6% growth rate range, following the same 
pattern as Portugal. 
Tunisia also had a notoriously bad year in 2009 regarding GDP per capita, however this rate 
has been recovering since. At the same time, the cement prices’ growth rate has been fairly 
stable, with a slight upward trend, which was outlined in the previous chapter. It is also 
noteworthy that cement prices in Tunisia are considerably lower than Portugal and Lebanon, 
which confirms this estimated growth potential. Assuming that cement prices shadow the 
behavior expected for GDP per capita, growth rates will increase considerably (7% on average), 
achieving values closer to Portugal and Lebanon in 2016/2017. 
Angola and Cape Verde have extremely high cement prices. The tendency has been for a 
reduction since 2006 and this reduction is expected to continue with the recent entrance of 
Chinese players in the markets, practicing incomparably lower prices. As these markets are 
expected to have astonishing growths in the near future (particularly Angola) competition 
should increase, which will bring prices down very quickly. 
All of these assumptions go in line with the overall convergence of cement prices in every 
market that is clear in Figure 71 below, not only in the forecasted period, but also in the 
previous years. 
 
Figure 71: Cement Price per ton forecast (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Having prices, market demand and market shares for Secil in each of the five countries, it is 
straightforward to compute cement related revenues. In order to have the total revenue 
estimations we need to forecast the revenues from the other countries where Secil has minor 
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operations (values not discriminated by country) and the other revenues related to ready 
mixed concrete and the other products (aggregates, precast concrete and mortars & binders). 
The assumption for these other products was that they will follow a similar growth as the 
country in general. This also applies to ready mixed concrete, which is expected to increase at 
rates in line with the past and to return to the pre-crisis values of growth rate. In the 
meanwhile, the tendency of increasing the weight of cement on total revenues should 
continue, at the detriment of ready mixed concrete (see Figure 72). 
 
Figure 72: Secil Revenues by Product forecast (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Finally, the cement operations in the other countries (not discriminated) were assumed to 
follow the general macroeconomic trends and growth rates, which is in line with recent past 
behavior. 
 
Figure 73: Secil Revenues Forecast in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
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Secil’s most significant cost lines are the personnel costs, cost of sales and materials consumed 
and external supplies and services. These costs are not discriminated by country and are only 
reported in a consolidated way. 
No note or additional information is provided about the cost of sales and materials consumed. 
However, when looking at its historical weight on revenues, we can see that there seems to be 
a straight link between the two. There seems to have been a slight increase in recent years, 
possibly due to the increase of the materials prices, however, I will assume that these will 
stabilize and the weight of the cost of materials sold and consumed over sales will tend to 
return to its earlier values. 
 
Figure 74: Operational Costs % over Revenues (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
External supplies and services are very stable and are composed by subcontracts, specialist 
services, miscellaneous services, travelling and transport costs and energy and oil. However, 
this has only been detailed in Secil’s reports since 2010 and therefore there isn’t sufficient 
historical background to make a compact analysis of its expected trends. 
Since these costs have kept a close association with the revenues (32%-36%), even throughout 
ups and downs on the revenues, I will assume that this feature will endure in the future and 
that external supplies and services will grow in line with revenues, keeping the same relative 
weight as in the past. 
Regarding personnel costs there is more information available. First of all, the Government 
Bodies’ remuneration is fixed at 1% of revenues and it will be assumed to remain so. The post-
employment benefits account also has a stable annual income which is expected to continue, 
as an average of the previous periods.  
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The “other personnel costs”, for which there is no additional information, seems to be directly 
linked to employees’ remuneration. Since 2007 “other personnel costs” have represented 37% 
of employee’s remunerations without any fluctuation whatsoever. For this reason, this 
connection will be assumed to continue into the future. As for the employees’ remuneration 
itself, it has been growing at a recurrent rate close to 1,5%, having deviated only in 2008, when 
there was a slight -0,1% reduction. The expectations, however, are that the 1,5% annual 
increase  will endure in the future and this was assumed for the remaining of the explicit 
period.  
 
Figure 75: Secil Operational Costs forecast in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Capital Expenditures and Net Working Capital 
Capital Expenditures were expected to remain constant as a percentage of revenues. This was 
the case for every year before the crisis and, despite yearly fluctuations, the average after 
2009 has also been close to 7%, which was assumed as the ratio for the explicit period. 
 
Figure 76: Secil Net Working Capital forecast in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
Current Assets 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Inventories 53.669 69.803 95.308 80.427 100.388 101.737 103.772 98.583 99.569 104.547 110.820 111.928
Trade receivables 112.288 103.841 92.502 93.812 83.851 82.601 69.319 67.666 69.377 71.866 73.202 74.821
Advances to suppliers 0 0 0 0 1.880 1.223 0 0 0 0 0 0
State and other public entities 19.855 16.905 12.858 7.393 7.189 13.642 8.789 9.668 13.535 12.181 19.490 17.541
Other financial assets 0 0 0 0 0 1.575 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-current assets held for sale 0 0 0 0 0 30.031 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash and cash equivalents 37.802 54.300 34.162 57.627 70.543 65.449 78.539 87.525 86.612 100.185 106.012 118.055
Total 223.614 244.849 234.830 239.259 263.851 296.258 260.418 263.442 269.092 288.780 309.524 322.345
Current Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Trade payables 39.185 91.860 123.169 107.161 38.875 48.893 52.475 57.183 62.632 64.432 70.678 72.241
Advances from customers 0 0 0 0 1.765 1.841 0 0 0 0 0 0
State and other public entities 20.707 35.828 38.372 33.410 32.713 36.491 31.637 32.516 36.383 35.030 42.339 40.390
Related parties 0 0 0 0 1.372 2.977 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest-bearing loans and borrowings 66.209 82.872 69.276 98.698 24.832 48.109 68.843 70.636 66.231 69.542 58.944 67.429
Other accounts payable 0 0 0 0 35.707 39.407 37.557 37.557 38.174 37.763 37.831 37.923
Liabilities directly associated with non-current assets held for sale0 0 0 0 0 5.708 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred liabilities 27.666 0 0 0 120 344 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other financial liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 161 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 153.767 210.560 230.817 239.269 135.384 183.930 190.512 197.893 203.420 206.767 209.791 217.982
Non-cash Net Working Capital 98.254 62.861 39.127 41.061 82.755 94.987 60.210 48.661 45.291 51.370 52.664 53.737
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Net Working Capital was computed as current assets net of cash minus current liabilities net of 
interest-bearing liabilities, as detailed above. 
In 2011 there were several reporting differences, such as the non-current assets held for sale 
and the liabilities directly related, other financial assets and liabilities, advances to suppliers 
and from customers, related parties and deferred liabilities which weren’t reported separately 
in the past. For simplification purposes, given the lack of history and clear explanations in most 
cases it was assumed that these lines would be reported in a more concise way, as they were 
until 2010.  
Therefore, these current assets were converted into cash while the current liabilities were 
converted into short-term debt. 
Inventories are expected to decrease when sales grow above expected and to increase when 
sales are slow, always within a close distance to 20% of revenues. Trade receivables and 
payables are also expected to grow in line with revenues, with a stable percentage of 
revenues, growing slightly along with the economy.  
State and other public entities relates to the corporate income taxes include mainly corporate 
income taxes disputed by the firm. Some of these legal actions have expected outcomes and 
liquidation timetables which will be assumed as effective.  
Finally, the other accounts payable, which are current liabilities related to fixed assets 
suppliers, creditors for accrued costs and other creditors is assumed to remain in line with the 
recent past. 
Others 
The earnings of associates and JV, which amount for less than 0,1% of revenues, were assumed 
to be constant in the future and equal to the historical average, as no particular pattern or 
trend can concluded from the past periods. 
The changes in production inventories were assumed to follow the same pattern as the past 
periods, while impairments of inventories and accounts receivable were assumed to remain 
constant as a percentage of the related costs/revenues. 
Secil’s provisions have been fairly stable in the past, with exceptions in 2006 and 2011 when 
there were significant increases to the provision account. These amounts were set aside to 
fully cover the negative equity of associates. These extraordinary aren’t expected to repeat in 
the future and therefore the remaining periods were used to estimate the provisions for the 
future. 
The other income and gains are mainly composed by free greenhouse emission rights granted 
by the Government. The attribution of these rights in the 2013-2020 period is dependent on 
the guidelines established by the European Commission in 2010. According to Secil’s most 
recently publish Sustainability Report, the company is not expected to be excluded from the 
list of companies in the sector which will be granted rights. Therefore, it will be assumed that 
the free emission grants will be in line with the past values. 
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The other costs and losses’ main components are much vaguer: costs and losses of non-
financial assets, indirect taxes, unfavorable currency differences and other operating costs, 
with no further explanation. In the past there were some higher values because the emission 
rights weren’t granted for free. Considering the previously stated assumption that Secil will 
continue to receive greenhouse emission grants, than it is assumed that the other costs and 
losses will remain aligned with the most recent periods. 
Depreciations and amortization costs relate to tangible and intangible assets which must be 
forecasted differently. 
 
Figure 77: Secil Property, Plant and Equipment forecast in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
Regarding tangible fixed assets, responsible for about 65% of the total depreciation and 
amortization costs, the assumption was that property, plant and equipment will grow at an 
average 3% annual rate, in line with the last decade’s annual growth. The annual depreciations 
and amortizations will account for 3% of the total value of property, plant and equipment, 
which has been happening uninterruptedly since 2006. 
Intangible assets (mainly composed by emission rights) are consumed at an average 91% per 
year, with the remaining residual difference transiting into the next period. The net amount of 
emission rights transiting into the next year is fairly stable averaging only 2.75 M€. 
The impairments of depreciable assets are losses of emission rights, which are exceptional and 
unpredictable events. The average of the past periods was considered as a constant for the 
future. 
It was also assumed that 80% of net income would be attributable to shareholders in the 
future. 
Equity Valuation – Grupo Semapa 
 
   
71  
 
8.2.1.3. Capital Structure Assumptions 
By the end of 2011 Secil had a balanced capital structure composed by 53% of equity and 47% 
of debt. In 2006/2007 debt represented 49% of total assets, however, when the crisis hit, the 
weight of debt on total assets reduced as a precaution, however, with the foreseen economic 
recovery, Secil has been returning to the former levels of debt/equity ratio. It seems that Secil 
aims for a 50/50 debt/equity ratio and the tendency should be to return to these values. 
 
Figure 78: Secil Capital Structure forecast (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
The company’s debt as of 2011 was composed by 48 M€ in short-term bank loans and bank 
overdrafts, 40 M€ in bonds issued in 2007 and expiring in the end of 2017 and 120 M€ of other 
non-current bank loans, with the maturities detailed below. 
 
Figure 79: Secil Outstanding Debt 2011 in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Report 2011) 
It was assumed that Secil will repay each year’s current debt with the issue of new debt to 
cover 50% and cash for the remainder. Also, it was assumed that Secil will issue amounts 
between 30-50 M€ of debt every year to maintain the 50/50 debt structure. It was assumed 
that 60% of new debt issues will be current debt maturing within the same year and 40% 
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maturing in 5+ years. Finally, it was assumed that 40% of all 5+ years’ debt will transit into 4-5 
years debt every year. 
This yields the following debt plan: 
 
Figure 80: Secil Debt Repayment Plan forecast in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
8.2.1.4. Terminal Value Assumptions 
The terminal value is computed after the explicit period of 6 years, ending in 2017 using the 
same approach as Portucel: the WACC method. 
 
Figure 81: Secil WACC calculation (Source: Secil Annual Reports, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, damodaran.com & own calculations) 
The terminal tax rate used was 24,5%, which is the estimated average effective tax rate for the 
period after the post-crisis stabilization (2014-2017), considering the different markets and tax 
rates that the company applies. 
The cost of debt was estimated using a default spread of 3,75%, associated with a BB+ rated 
company according to Damodaran. Although Secil is unrated, this spread is justified by the 
historical interest expenses of the company, which were very close to this value in the past 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
expired 5y 68.843
expired 4y 68.843 70.636
expired 3y 68.843 70.636 66.231
expired 2y 68.843 70.636 66.231 69.542
expired 1y 68.843 70.636 66.231 69.542 58.944
0-1 year 48.109 68.843 70.636 66.231 69.542 58.944 67.429
1-2 years 39.977 22.863 27.040 19.673 20.081 19.746 24.587
2-3 years 22.863 27.040 19.673 20.081 19.746 24.587 25.203
3-4 years 27.040 19.673 20.081 19.746 24.587 25.203 28.420
4-5 years 19.673 20.081 19.746 24.587 25.203 28.420 27.416
5+ years 50.203 49.365 61.468 63.008 71.051 68.539 72.912
New Debt 48.109 79.622 65.318 83.115 64.771 79.472 33.715
t = 24,50%
Rf  = 1,37%
Country risk premium = 6,30%
Beta = 1,37
E/V = 0,50
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000€ 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E Terminal
EBIT * (1-tax) 59.309 63.868 75.326 76.280 58.848 34.654 32.357 27.937 33.507 31.036 31.570 32.355
Depreciations and amortizations 56.694 61.487 56.793 53.284 81.930 85.137 86.438 89.846 90.955 92.906 94.974 96.629
(Capital Expenditures) (34.000) (41.000) (40.615) (30.830) (44.165) (62.210) (34.171) (33.357) (33.725) (34.694) (35.339) (36.120)
(Change in Non-Cash Net Working Capital) 33.459 35.393 23.733 (1.934) (41.694) (12.232) 34.777 11.549 3.369 (6.079) (1.294) (1.073)
FCFF 115.463 119.748 115.238 96.799 54.919 45.349 119.401 95.975 94.107 83.168 89.911 91.791 1.051.624
PV = 86.837 77.040 61.602 60.256 55.658 637.662
three years. This spread was applied to the Euribor 6m, estimated in section 8.1.2.5. The 
perpetual Kd was, again, assumed as an average of the last three years: 6,8%. 
Ke was computed using the same formula, with the levered beta assumed as 1,37, which was 
the value used by BESI in their valuation of Secil. The cost of equity for Secil yields 15,9%, 
which is reasonably higher than Portucel’s due to the higher beta.  
Using the Debt/Equity ratio of 50% explained in the previous section and a growth rate of 
1,5%, considering that the high expected growth rates of Angola, Tunisia, Lebanon and Cape 
Verde are outweighed by Portugal’s decline. This rate is slightly below the estimated inflation 
rate. Finally, WACC is calculated yielding 10,5%. 
Figure 82: Secil FCFF and Terminal Value calculation in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
Using the same FCFF formula to compute the firm’s leveraged value, we reach a final 
enterprise value for Secil of roughly 979 M€. 
 
Figure 83: Secil Enterprise Value and Market Cap calculation in thousands of € (Source: Secil Annual Reports & 
own calculations) 
By deducting net debt and minority interests, we conclude that the estimated market 
capitalization for Secil is 852,7 M€ 
8.2.2. Multiples 
Secil’s peer group was based on Damodaran’s database. The basis was European construction 
companies with market caps above $500.000. Since Secil isn’t quoted, it wasn’t included in 
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Company Name Trailing PE PBV EV/EBIT EV/EBITDA
Cementos Molins SA 10 0,6 11 6
Italcementi SpA 6 0,2 21 5
Vicat SA 9 0,7 8 6
Ciments Francais SA 8 0,5 10 4
Cimentos De Portugal, SGPS, S.A. 14 1,7 13 8
Average 9 0,7 13 6
Market Cap Market Cap Enterprise Value Enterprise Value
520.575 € 324.499 € 989.444 € 952.243 €
Secil implied valuation:
Further investigation into each of these companies’ operations eliminates Italmobiliare SpA, 
RHI AG, Imerys SA and CRH plc because they aren’t focused on cement, concrete and 
aggregates, as all the other companies listed above. Furthermore, HeidelbergCement AG, 
Lafarge S.A. and Holcim Ltd were not considered for the peer group because they are market 
leaders with incomparably higher revenues and overall size. 
Lastly, Titan Cement Company S.A. and Buzzi Unicem SpA were also excluded. The Greek 
company is the only one that has estimations for declining revenues in the next two years, at 
an even steeper rate as the last five years’ average. The Italian company on the other hand 
was the only company with negative net profit margin. Moreover, the ROIC for both these 
companies is the lowest within the whole group, deeming them incomparable to Secil, which 
has significantly different ratios in all the crucial measures. 
Figure 85: Secil Peer Group in thousands of € (Source: Damodaran.com & own calculations) 
Secil’s peer group is thus composed by these five other companies, all specialized in the 
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US $)













Italmobiliare SpA Italy $612 $4.635 $5.247 45 0,08 17 4 NA -3% 3% 0%
Cementos Molins SA Spain $688 $802 $1.250 10 0,56 11 6 10% 4% NA 6%
RHI AG Austria $777 $580 $1.256 5 1,52 7 5 22% 9% 5% 6%
Titan Cement Company S.A. Greece $1.164 $1.349 $2.197 15 0,51 15 6 4% -5% -7% 5%
Italcementi SpA Italy $1.293 $3.996 $5.289 6 0,20 21 5 NA -3% 1% 3%
Buzzi Unicem SpA Italy $1.627 $2.160 $3.191 NA 0,44 24 7 3% -3% 5% -3%
Vicat SA France $2.522 $2.099 $4.174 9 0,73 8 6 20% 2% 9% 9%
Ciments Francais SA France $2.809 $2.401 $5.209 8 0,51 10 4 7% -1% 0% 7%
Imerys SA France $3.490 $1.877 $5.367 9 1,22 9 6 13% NA 7% 8%
Cimentos De Portugal, SGPS, S.A. Portugal $4.599 $2.958 $6.802 14 1,71 13 8 17% 7% 5% 11%
HeidelbergCement AG Germany $8.015 $12.773 $19.532 16 0,46 12 7 13% 9% 5% 3%
Lafarge S.A. France $10.125 $21.801 $29.292 11 0,42 10 6 14% 1% -2% 4%
CRH plc Ireland $14.347 $7.538 $20.355 20 1,00 18 10 6% 2% 3% 3%
Holcim Ltd. Switzerland $17.201 $16.803 $30.609 15 0,80 12 6 8% -2% -2% 5%
Figure 84: European Construction Companies with Market Cap > $ 500.000 (Source: Damodaran.com) 
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based valuation of Secil, under any of the four chosen types of multiples, is lower than the DCF 
based valuation. 
Once again, it is visible that, as expected, the company’s market capitalization under the PBV 
multiple is much lower than the DCF estimated value. It is once more clear that this multiple is 
not adequate for companies with high levels of property and other fixed assets. 
For the PE multiple the trailing approach was used instead of the more adequate forward 
approach. The only reason for this was the lack of available reliable forward data for the 
comparable companies. This multiple also yields values much lower than the 852,7 M€ 
obtained through the DCF valuation, since the peer group’s multiples were gathered in 2012, 
when companies were generally undervalued due to the ongoing crisis. Another reason for this 
could be the fact that the peer group is composed by European companies which, although 
operating internationally, don’t have such a strong presence in fast growing markets, such as 
Angola. This increased value is not reflected in this multiples’ valuation, but has a significant 
impact on the DCF valuation. 
Finally, using the average between the EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA multiples, Secil’s market cap is 
valued at 844 M€, which is significantly closer to the values computed through DCF. 
 
Figure 86: Sensitivity Analysis - Secil Market Capitalization using Multiples in thousands of € (Source: 
Damodaran.com & own calculations) 
Looking at the range of values obtained from the peer group, it is possible to conclude that the 
DCF computed market cap for Secil is within the range for the EV based analysis, but not for 
the trailing PE multiple. This reflects the optimism regarding the expected growth rates in the 
emerging markets, not fully displayed in this analysis, but also makes it clear that PE is not the 
most adequate multiple to value depreciations, amortizations and CAPEX intensive companies, 
such as Secil. 
8.3. Supremo Cimentos S.A. 
There isn’t much information available for Supremo Cimentos S.A. yet. However it is known 
that the company is undergoing an expansion project which should increase the cement 
production capacity by five times the current capacity. The current annual revenue is roughly 
40 M€, the company has net debt of 10,7 M€ and the assets’ book value is reported as 92,8 
M€. 
Supremo Cimentos S.A. was valued under a multiples approach. The peer group was initially 
composed by South American companies operating in the cement industry. 
Market Capitalization Trailing PE EV/EBIT & EV/EBITDA
Lowest 360.929 € 544.061 €
Average 520.575 € 844.468 €
Highest 766.171 € 1.379.566 €
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From this group were excluded Melon SA, due to the lack of available data, and Cemento 
Polpaico S.A. and Cementos Bio-Bio S.A. due to the lack of growth prospects, as well as in the 
past 5 years. Cementos Argos was also excluded because the multiples and ROIC are very out 
of tune with the remainder of the considered companies, which could be explained by the 
company’s large size (fourth largest cement producer in Latin America and sixth in the United 
States). 
The remaining companies seem much more similar and representative of the South American 
cement industry. However, due to lack of data about Supremo, only the PBV and EV/Sales 
multiples can be computed. 
 
Figure 88: Supremo Peer Group in thousands of € (Source: Damodaran.com & own calculations) 
For PBV the reported Supremo’s book value of assets (92.805 €) was considered. For the 
EV/Sales multiple (since no EBIT or EBITDA is available for a full-year) two scenarios were 
assumed: using the current sales value and using a sales value five times higher than the 
Company Name PBV EV/(Current) Sales EV/(Expected) Sales
Compania Industrial El Volcan S.A. 1,1 1,9 1,9
Cemento Andino 1,2 2,9 2,9
Inversiones Argos 0,6 3,0 3,0
Eternit S.A. 1,9 0,9 0,9
Cementos Pacasmayo SAA 3,6 3,4 3,4
Juan Minetti S.A. 1,5 1,0 1,0
Magnesita Refratarios S.A. 0,6 1,0 1,0
Average 1,5 2,0 2,0
Market Cap Enterprise Value Enterprise Value
137.322 € 77.931 € 389.654 €
Lowest 57.722 € 36.542 € 182.708 €








Value (in US $)
















Cemento Polpaico S.A. Chile $206 $85 $286 142 1,28 NA 14 0% 0% NA 1% $267
Compania Industrial El Volcan S.A. Chile $252 $4 $247 13 1,06 14 8 8% 4% NA 15% $132
Cemento Andino Peru $260 $193 $444 8 1,16 8 7 18% NA NA 20% $155
Cementos Argos Colombia $6.441 $1.768 $7.369 73 1,08 57 32 2% NA 15% 5% $1.576
Inversiones Argos Colombia $5.591 $2.860 $8.450 30 0,65 13 10 10% NA NA 6% $2.819
Eternit S.A. Brazil $423 $21 $430 8 1,85 8 5 28% 19% 7% 12% $457
Cementos Pacasmayo SAA Peru $979 $120 $1.084 33 3,56 13 10 27% 7% NA 8% $320
Cementos Bio-Bio S.A. Chile $381 $414 $784 NA 0,92 20 8 4% -2% NA -10% $618
Juan Minetti S.A. Argentina $379 $16 $383 7 1,45 6 5 24% 20% NA 12% $388
Melon SA Chile $966 $104 $1.068 NA 1,85 NA NA 0% NA NA NA $0
Magnesita Refratarios S.A. Brazil $896 $948 $1.381 16 0,62 9 5 18% NA 5% 5% $1.371
Figure 87: South American Construction Companies (Source: Damodaran.com) 
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current, reflecting the impact of the new plant which should increase the company’s cement 
production capacity by five times in 2014. In this scenario I am assuming that Supremo’s 
capacity utilization will remain the same and therefore the increase in capacity will be 
proportional to the increase in production. Both scenarios use the peer group’s EV/Sales 
multiples reported by Damodaran. 
As commented before in the Secil case, the PBV should yield a lower market capitalization than 
the company’s true value, due to the industry’s specificities. This fact is useful to make clear 
that using the current sales to compute the company’s enterprise value would result in a 
tremendous undervaluation. This is why the second scenario was assumed. 
Supremo’s enterprise value is significantly higher when using future sales as the estimation 
basis. This, however, is a very optimistic scenario, as it assumes that Supremo would produce 
at full capacity and sell all the production at the current price. For this reason, a more realistic 
approach was taken. The value considered for Supremo is the average between the “current 
sales” scenario and the mid-value between the pessimistic and the average in the “expected 
sales” scenario. The result is a 182 M€ enterprise value. 
As a feasibility check, this value can be compared to Secil’s enterprise value. Under these 
assumptions, Supremo is worth about 19% of Secil’s estimated enterprise value, under a 
multiples’ approach. This value is somewhat comparable to the ratio between the capacities: 
Supremo’s expected 1.750 thousand tons represent 26% of Secil’s 6.850 thousand tons 
capacity.  
The implied lower valuation of Supremo is logical, given that it is a much more recent 
company, with most of its value relying on the future impact of its investment plan, which is 
obviously not straightforward to forecast accurately. 
8.4. ETSA Group 
ETSA was also valued under a multiples approach. The peer group was composed by European 
profit-seeking companies operating in the environmental and waste industries with revenues 
below $150 M. From this group were excluded the companies that expect to decline in sales in 
the future and that have negative ROIC and net income. 
 
Figure 89: ETSA Peer Group in thousands of € (Source: Damodaran.com & own calculations) 
Company Name Country Trailing PE EV/EBIT EV/EBITDA
Lucent Oil AB Sweden 15 6 5,0
Augean plc United Kingdom 23 26 5,7
Environnement, S.A. France 11 10 6,2
Average 16 14 5,6
Market Cap Enterprise Value Enterprise Value
45.134 € 63.630 € 45.495 €
Lowest 29.925 € 25.300 € 40.500 €
Highest 64.151 € 121.891 € 50.220 €
ETSA implied valuation:
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This selection was enough to filter the peer group down to three truly comparable companies. 
The PE multiple yields the highest enterprise value (67.834 € by adding net debt), which 
transpires the market’s confidence in this industry’s high growth rates. On the other hand, 
EV/EBITDA yields the lowest. However, whichever multiple is considered, all values fall within 
each other’s feasible interval.  
To roundup, I considered an average of the EV computed by the three multiples, thus resulting 
in an assumed enterprise value of 58.986 €. 
8.5. Holding 
The last component of Semapa, which cannot be disregarded is the Holding itself. As a holding 
company, it has costs that have to be taken into account to reach the company’s final value. As 
there is almost no visibility into the type of costs the holding company has I have taken the last 
year’s reported costs and assumed they grow in line with inflation. The reported depreciations, 
amortizations and capital expenditures were also considered in the same way, however they 
barely have any impact in the valuation. 
 
Figure 90: Holding WACC calculation (Source: Semapa Annual Reports, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, damodaran.com & own calculations) 
The FCFF was discounted at a 9,7% WACC, computed by taking the same general assumptions 
used for Portucel. The beta was computed as a weighted average of the betas of Secil and 
Portucel, while the Kd was computed based on the holding’s outstanding loans, detailed 
below: 
The Euribor 6m indexed loans were assumed to pay a default spread of 1,15% above the 
Euribor 6m estimated earlier. This spread is based on an AA credit rating which is attributed to 
a company with an interest coverage ratio of 6,5 as was reported in BESI’s analysis of Semapa 
(see Appendix 10).  
t = 25,60%
Rf  = 1,37%
Country risk premium = 6,30%
Beta = 1,01
E/V = 0,5





Bond loans 2012-2015 2012-2017 2006-2016 2006-2016 Bank loans non-current non-current
Amount 300.000€ 128.100€ 175.000€ 50.000€ Amount 133.079€ 12.000€
Maturity march 2015 april 2017 april 2016 may 2016 Maturity 5+ years 5+ years
Interest rate 6,85% Euribor 6m Euribor 6m Euribor 6m Interest rate Euribor 6m Euribor 6m
Figure 91: Semapa Holding Outstanding Debt 2012 (Source: Semapa Annual Report 2012) 
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000€ 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E Terminal
EBIT * (1-tax) (9.345) 8.045 1.815 (10.995) (16.972) (14.495) (14.154) (14.409) (14.697) (15.006) (15.321) (15.627)
Depreciations and amortizations 144 142 152 161 267 331 338 344 351 359 366 374
(Capital Expenditures) (214) (163) (201) (47) (689) (750) (767) (781) (796) (813) (830) (847)
FCFF (9.415) 8.024 1.766 (10.881) (17.394) (14.914) (14.583) (14.845) (15.142) (15.460) (15.785) (16.100) (130.393)
PV = (13.533) (12.583) (11.712) (10.901) (10.136) (82.090)
Figure 92: Holding FCFF and Terminal Value calculation in thousands of € (Source: Semapa Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
To the sum of these present values, it is necessary to deduct the total net debt, in order to 
achieve the holding’s final market capitalization, which is significantly negative; -961,3 M€ in 
total. 
 
Figure 93: Holding Enterprise Value and Market Cap calculation (Source: Semapa Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
8.6. Semapa final valuation 
Finally, Semapa’s estimated value can be obtained by the sum of the parts approach, based on 
the equity values computed above for the four companies owned by Semapa, deducted of the 
Holding’s value. 
 
Figure 94: Final EV and Market Caps for 100% Equity in thousands of € (Source: Semapa, Secil and Portucel Annual 
Reports & own calculations) 
However, when valuing Semapa we can only take into account the stakes that Semapa has in 
each company. The latest reported ownership stakes of Semapa in each of the companies was 
considered and the EV and market cap of each company is thus computed directly: 
 





Semapa EV Market Cap
Portucel 2.842.223 € 2.379.763 €
Secil 979.055 € 852.680 €
Supremo 182.056 € 171.456 €
ETSA 58.986 € 36.286 €
Holding (140.955 €) (961.255 €)
Semapa EV Market Cap
Portucel (78,1%) 2.219.776 € 1.858.595 €
Secil (100%) 979.055 € 852.680 €
Supremo (50%) 91.028 € 85.728 €
ETSA (96%) 56.627 € 34.835 €
Holding (100%) (140.955 €) (961.255 €)
Sum of the parts 3.205.531 € 1.870.582 €
Equity Valuation – Grupo Semapa 
 




Figure 96: Semapa Valuation in millions of € (Source: Semapa, Portucel and Secil Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
Considering that Semapa has 112.884.470 shares, the intrinsic value of each share is 16,57 €. 
This compares to the 7,19 € per share at which the company closed the trading session of 
08/02/2013, signifying a +130% upside potential. 
This very optimistic scenario is partly supported by the company’s historical trading price. 
Since 2006, Semapa had its worst performance during 2012, which is clear in the image below, 
revealing a clearly undervalued company.  
 
The first months of 2013, which are already visible in the graph below, suggest a clear recovery 
as was predicted throughout this paper, reaching its highest value since July 2011, still beneath  
the potential 16,57 €.  
The highest value at which Semapa’s shares traded since 2006 was 13,55 €, in July 2007, right 
before the crisis struck. However, since then the company has undergone very significant 
changes. It has invested heavily in Secil and Supremo, two companies that offer high growth 
potential, and also in the new Portucel paper mill, which increased by more than 30% the 
capacity of the most profitable of the group’s products: paper. 
Figure 97: Semapa Share Price 2006-2013 (Source: Yahoo Finance) 
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All of these factors together explain for the most part this unusual upside potential, which is 
intensified by the undergoing crisis that noticeably created pessimism in the markets and led 
to the undervaluation of most companies, which are trading well below their true potential 
value. 
8.6.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section I will test the impact of some key drivers on the estimated share price of 
Semapa. This will allow a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of each of the 
main value drivers as well as a perspective of the company’s value under more pessimistic or 
optimistic scenarios. 
The most relevant value drivers for each company are the selling price (cement/paper) and the 
expected terminal growth rate. These are also the variables more susceptible to change, in the 
sense that they are harder to predict with precision than other variables.  
Considering that Portucel and Secil represent over 90% in absolute of the total Enterprise 
Value of Semapa, these should be considered the key drivers of value for the Group. However, 
for comparison purposes, two scenarios were also considered for Supremo and the Holding: 
for the Holding, I assumed a ± 20% variation to the Holding’s costs, whereas for Supremo I 
considered the current sales for the pessimistic scenario and 5x the current sales for the 
optimistic scenario, considering the average of the peer group, without the adjustment made 
in section 8.3. 
Figure 98: Semapa Share Price Sensitivity Analysis (Source: own calculations) 
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Semapa’s share price is most sensitive to paper price. This is not a surprising outcome, since 
paper and Portucel represent the largest portion of Semapa’s value and price is clearly the 
main value driver of Portucel. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that only a 5% change in the price 
of paper affects Semapa’s share price by 18%, deeming this a crucial factor, as was referred in 
section 8.1.1.4. However, as pointed out in section 8.1.1.4, paper prices have historically been 
very stable, even during crisis periods, and therefore a drastic change that could impact 
Semapa’s share price is not expected.  
The same effect on cement prices doesn’t have quite the same impact through Secil – a ±5% 
variation in cement prices only affects Semapa’s share price by ±1%. The impact would be the 
same for cement quantities sold, which is good for Semapa, since Secil’s prices and quantities 
sold are much less predictable than Portucel’s, that operates at full capacity and sells all the 
production, whereas Secil operates in fast growing but unstable markets and is quickly growing 
its operations. 
As in any valuation, terminal growth rate also plays an important role – a 1% variation impacts 
Semapa’s share price 14% through Portucel and 4% through Secil. This is one of the reasons 
why there are often claims that valuations are easily manipulated. However, if instead of trying 
to find out the exact value of the company we consider the range of values [13,6 ; 19,5] given 
by this analysis, we can have a good idea of the intrinsic value of the company, which is 
ultimately the goal of this paper. 
Finally, we can see that, as expected, there is no significant difference through Supremo (-3% 
or +6%) or the Holding (±1%). This allows us to conclude that in the most impacting scenario of 
a paper price fluctuation of ±5%, the company’s share price would range between 13,6 € and 
19,5 €. This analysis, however, assumed static scenarios where all other variables remain 
constant while one changes. In practice, this impact would tend to be partly mitigated by 
management adjustments, narrowing the gap to a smaller range of values within the same 
interval.  
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DISSERTATION VALUATION (excluding Supremo) BESI VALUATION BESI VALUATION - UNDER CURRENT STAKES
Semapa EV Market Cap Net debtSemapa EV Market Cap Net debtSemapa EV Market Cap
Portucel 2.842.223 € 2.379.763 € ###### Portucel 3.168.200 € 2.434.500 € ###### Portucel 3.168.200 € 2.434.500 €
Secil 979.055 € 852.680 € ###### Secil 1.040.588 € 953.137 € ###### Secil 1.040.588 € 953.137 €
ETSA 66.243 € 43.543 € ###### ETSA 41.000 € 30.700 € ###### ETSA 41.000 € 30.700 €
Holding (140.955 €) (961.255 €) ###### Holding (150.300 €) (813.100 €) ###### Holding (150.300 €) (813.100 €)
###### ######
Semapa EV Market Cap Semapa EV Market Cap Semapa EV Market Cap
Portucel (78,1%) 2.219.776 € 1.858.595 € Portucel (77%) 2.439.514 € 1.874.565 € Portucel (78,1%) 2.474.364 € 1.901.345 €
Secil (100%) 979.055 € 852.680 € Secil (51%) 530.700 € 486.100 € Secil (100%) 1.040.588 € 953.137 €
ETSA (96%) 56.627 € 34.835 € ETSA (80%) 32.800 € 24.560 € ETSA (96%) 39.360 € 29.472 €
Holding (100%) (140.955 €) (961.255 €) Holding (100%) (150.300 €) (813.100 €) Holding (100%) (150.300 €) (813.100 €)
Sum of the parts 3.114.503 € 1.784.854 € Sum of the parts 2.852.714 € 1.572.125 € Sum of the parts 3.404.012 € 2.070.854 €
Price Target 15,81 € Price Target 13,93 € Price Target 18,34 €
Comparison with BESI valuation 
 
The report prepared by Banco Espírito Santo de Investimento S.A. (BESI) was published in 
January 17th 2011, prior to the disclosure of the company’s 2010 year-end results, although it 
already considered the 3Q results and good indications into the 4Q. For this reason, there are 
significant discrepancies between the analyses, resulting mainly from the two big events in 
mid-2012: the acquisition of Supremo and the acquisition of the remaining 49% stake in Secil. 
The bank’s research also used a sum-of-the-parts DCF approach with an explicit period until 
2015. The report proposes a BUY rating for both Portucel and Semapa, with a target price for 
year-end 2011 of 13,93€ for Semapa and 3,20€ for Portucel, comparing to current prices (as of 
January 2011) of 8,63€ and 2,35€, respectively, representing upside potentials of 61% for 
Semapa and 36% for Portucel. 
However, in order to compare to this dissertation’s results, these values should be adjusted in 
order to account for current stakes in Secil in Portucel and to exclude Supremo from the 
valuation, since it wasn’t valued by BESI. Figure 99 below shows that under the current shares 
of Secil and Portucel, BESI’s valuation would suggest an 18,34€ price target for Semapa, which 
compares to a 15,81€ price target resulting from the exclusion of Supremo from the 
dissertation’s valuation, 14% below BESI’s target. 
We can see from Figure 100 and Error! Reference source not found. that the Enterprise Value 
computed by BESI is lower for Secil, ETSA and the Holding while it is higher for Portucel. The 
group’s total Net debt was 4,2% higher in January 2011 because of the company’s recent 
investment in the new Setúbal mill, through Portucel. All other three companies had lower net 
Figure 99: Comparison between the Dissertation and BESI’s Final Valuations and Price Targets in thousands of € (Source: Companies' Annual 
Reports, BESI report & own calculations) 
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debt in January 2011, compared to 2012. In fact, Portucel is the only company that reduced its 
net debt, while the Holding increased its debt significantly due to the 2012 acquisitions. 
Globally, BESI values Semapa’s Enterprise Value 9% above the dissertation’s valuation 
(excluding Supremo) while the market cap is 12% higher. 
Portucel 
The difference in Semapa’s Enterprise Value is explained in a large part by Portucel’s different 
outcome. This differential in turn is a result of significantly different approaches to the 
company’s expected EBITDA margins. This is the consequence of two different factors. 
 
Figure 101: Portucel's estimated EBITDA Margins (Source: BESI report & own calculations) 
The first is that BESI’s valuation was conducted before the first full-year report after the 
opening of the new mill was disclosed. For this reason, they did not have full visibility into the 
investment’s impact. Therefore, the bank assumed a 30% EBITDA margin based on the first 3Q 
of 2010, which was very close to the effective full-year result of 29%. However, BESI had no 
visibility into 2011 results, which evidenced an EBITDA margin reduction to 26%. 
In section 8.1.2.2 I argued that, since paper has a higher variable cost than pulp, as Portucel 
moves its sales more and more into paper, in detriment of pulp, the variable cost of each unit 
sold will increase. BESI admits the same idea – that the EBITDA margin will gradually decrease 
after the opening of the new mill, due to the higher sales margin of paper over pulp. 
EBITDA Margin 2008 2009 2010E* 2011E* 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Dissertation 23% 22% 29% 26% 26% 24% 23% 23% 23% 21%
BESI 23% 22% 30% 32% 31% 30% 29% 29% 29% 29%
Figure 100: Comparison between the Dissertation and BESI's valuations in thousands of € (Source: BESI report, Annual 
Reports & own calculations) 
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However, BESI’s valuation stood upon the expectation that the new mill would further increase 
its EBITDA margin to 32% and only then start a slow reduction, but the 2011 and mid-2012 
evidence showed that in fact the EBITDA margin was being undercut at the same rate as paper 
was outpacing pulp in the company’s total sales. 
For this reason I believe the assumption made in this paper is more accurate and BESI’s 
valuation was affected, in this case, by the unpredictability of the new mill’s true impact, 
whereas this dissertation benefited from an additional full-year report to conclude with more 
precision. 
The WACC underlying assumptions are another source of disagreement between the two 
papers: 
While in this dissertation I assumed a cost of debt indexed to the Euribor 6m (as stated by the 
company’s annual reports), the BESI report assumes a fixed 6,5% rate. This assumption seems 
flawed in two different ways: it assumes a flat rate, when the company clearly expresses all the 
major loans’ indexation factor as the Euribor 6m, and it assumes an excessively high cost of 
debt – in order for the cost of debt to be 6,5%, either the Euribor 6m would have to be 
constant and equal to 4% (which only happened for 20% of the recorded months since 1999 
and hasn’t happened since 2008) or the default spread would have to be assumed as higher 
than 4%. 
BESI also assumes a 4,5% risk free rate although at the date the report was published the 10-
year government bond yields were below 3% and had been so and decreasing for the entire 
previous year. Therefore, there is no clear explanation of why this rate was used. 
Lastly, the unlevered beta was assumed to be 1,00, which is an incorrect simplification, since 
the company’s returns are clearly not perfectly correlated to the market’s. 
Secil 
BESI valued Secil based on different estimates for each country. The estimates for cement 
consumption were based on a model grounded on the same assumption made in this paper - 
that until a certain level of GDP per capita consumption per capita increases and then starts to 
decline. 
However, each country’s potential and expected growth timings were classified differently. For 
instance, BESI classified Tunisia as a high growth potential market; however it was assumed 
that this growth would not start until 2015. 
Furthermore, the BESI report was published before Secil reinforced its strong 
internationalization intents. For this reason, it assumes that the sales in Portugal don’t reduce 
but instead remain fairly stable, with the investments being focused in this country. This 
results in a higher share of sales for Portugal, which has lower prices, which, in turn were 
assumed even slightly lower under BESI’s assumptions compared to this dissertation. The 
result was a somewhat lower EBITDA margin that explains the lower Enterprise Value 
estimated by BESI. 
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Once again, it is evident that the 2011 and mid-2012 results offered some important insights 
that were not considered by the BESI report. In this case the tendency to underinvest in 
Portugal (compared to the African countries) is unmistakable, however the tendency was 
greatly reinforced by the 2011 and mid-2012 reports, which included notes from the Directors 
highlighting the strong intent to pursue an international diversification market. 
Furthermore, the WACC underlying assumptions are, again, difficult to understand, for the 
same reasons: the risk free rate was, again, assumed as 4,5%; the cost of debt was assumed as 
fixed but this time at an even higher rate of 7%.  
ETSA 
In this case the valuation methods were significantly different. The BESI analysts valued the 
ETSA group using a DCF approach. However, they assumed a no-growth scenario, with stable 
EBITDA margins (28%) and sales growing in line with inflation.  
This report used a sensitive multiple approach valuation to value ETSA. Consequently it is not 
feasible to compare the two valuations. Nevertheless, it seems clear that a no-growth scenario 
isn’t realistic, considering the company’s historical growth rates, which were considerable and 
stable.  
Additionally, if we consider the average Enterprise Value computed by the worst case scenario 
multiple valuation in section 8.4, using the three different multiples, we achieve an Enterprise 
Value of 45,5 M€ which is still higher than BESI’s valuation of the company assuming no 
growth. 
Holding 
Alike this dissertation, BESI valued the Holding as a sum of its net debt and the present value 
of the future costs. The assumption to estimate the Holding’s future costs was that they would 
grow in line with inflation; however the bank used only the value reported in the previous year 
as the basis for this growth as a conservative approach, since it was the highest reported value 
to date, while in this paper I assumed the average of the last three years. Furthermore, despite 
differences in the assumptions regarding the WACC variables, the final WACC used by BESI to 
value the Holding was very similar to the one used in this paper (10% vs 9,7% in this 
dissertation). 
All in all, BESI’s approach to value the Holding was similar, which is natural given the lack of 
options that result from the scarce information on the relevant costs reported by the 
company. Despite some minor variances in the assumptions and the values used to estimate 
WACC and FCFF, the outputs were consistent. The slight difference in the EV is mainly 
explained by the different basis used to estimate the future cash flows of the Holding. 
Portugal share of Revenue 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Dissertation 73% 68% 67% 65% 61% 58% 55% 52% 49% 46%
BESI 71% 66% 66% 63% 64% 64% 64% 64% 65% 65%
Figure 102: Share of Portugal & Others cement sales in Total Salers (Source: BESI report, Secil Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
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Main Conclusions  
 
The first and most evident conclusion is that there is no universal method. Each company and 
each circumstance requires a certain approach and a particular type of analysis. The academic 
community has thoroughly analyzed every aspect of each valuation approach, but there is still 
large divergence of opinions as to what method is more appropriate to each type of company.  
What becomes apparent from this debate is that no research will suffice to single a general-
purpose model that is the obvious best valuation model for any valuation in any part of the 
world - no model fits all, and each model adds to the other, complementing each other. 
The second conclusion is that no matter which model is used, if each model’s defects are 
mitigated correctly and the assumptions are accurate and identical, the outcome should be the 
exact same.  
This opens the door to the perception of a third conclusion: a valuation’s true value and 
accuracy is in the assumptions. These are the true differentiators of valuations, and these are 
the true drivers of accuracy and feasibility. In fact, a perfectly applied valuation model will 
result in a bogus outcome if the assumptions it is grounded on are not correctly aligned with 
reality. 
Furthermore, it is remarkable how some of the assumptions made by a prestigious investment 
bank like BESI seem subjective and utterly unsupported by data. Some of these assumptions 
seem to be driven by a certain outcome expectation, which is not only incomprehensible, but 
also worrisome. It doesn’t seem reasonable nor understandable that a valuation conducted by 
an investment bank is grounded on unjustified assumptions that don’t match publicly reported 
figures and that seem strangely rounded to simplistic whole figures (e.g. 1,00 unlevered beta; 
4,50% risk free rate; 0,50 debt/equity ratio; 7,00% cost of debt; 5,00% equity risk premium; 
10,00% WACC). 
Finally, this dissertation brought on the understanding that every valuation is at the mercy of 
the information it has access to. While it is a quoted company, with all the most significant 
information disclosed to the public, it revealed very problematic to get information from the 
company’s Investor Relation department on the details that were not included in the 
company’s reports. This was particularly felt on the valuation of ETSA, Supremo and the 
international divisions of Secil.  
This difficulty to access the entirety of the required information can be a very relevant barrier 
to any independent valuation since, as mentioned before, a valuation is only as good as the 
assumptions its grounded on which, in turn, are necessarily constructed upon the available 
information. 
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Appendix 1: Growth rate vs Industry average (Source: Damodaran, "Closure in Valuation") 
 
Appendix 2: Western Europe GDP growth and inflation forecast (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [October 
17th 2012])  
 
Appendix 3: Western Europe GDP growth (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [October 17th 2012]) 
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Appendix 4: World Economic Forecast (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [October 17th 2012]) 
 
 
Appendix 5: Main Policy Interest Rates of the European Central Bank & Federal Reserve forecast (Source: The 
Economist Intelligence Unit [October 17th 2012]) 
 
Appendix 6: Main Policy Interest Rates forecast (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit [October 17th 2012]) 
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Appendix 7: Comparison of retail fuel prices in Europe as of November 2010 (in US-cents/Litre) (Source: GIZ - 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
 
Appendix 8: PIX Pulp prices in USD/ton 2008-2010 (Source: FOEX [23rd October 2012]) 
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Appendix 9: Portucel Non-Current Assets annual variation 2005-2011 (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own 
calculations) 
 
Appendix 10: Credit Ratings & Default Spreads (Source: Damodaran, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar) 
Last updated: January 2012 
Annual variations (000 €) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Goodwill 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other intangible assets -11.038 -786 3.182 -2.260 -2.247 2.682
Property, Plant and Equipment -66.182 -33.898 166.816 406.344 -22.262 -74.421
Biological Assets -12.943 -371 -98 -4.537 -7.787 267
Available-for-sale financial assets 516 -386 0 0 -4 0
Investment in associates -358 0 0 0 516 1.262
Deferred tax assets -21.593 -18.620 -6.040 276 5.201 23.308
Annual % of non-current assets in absolute value 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Goodwill 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other intangible assets 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Property, Plant and Equipment 4% 2% 10% 19% 1% 4%
Biological Assets 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Available-for-sale financial assets 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Investment in associates 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Deferred tax assets 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
For large manufacturing firms
If interest coverage ratio is
> ≤ to Rating is Spread is
-100000 0,199999 D 12,00%
0,2 0,649999 C 10,50%
0,65 0,799999 CC 9,50%
0,8 1,249999 CCC 8,75%
1,25 1,499999 B- 6,75%
1,5 1,749999 B 6,00%
1,75 1,999999 B+ 5,50%
2 2,2499999 BB 4,75%
2,25 2,49999 BB+ 3,75%
2,5 2,999999 BBB 2,50%
3 4,249999 A- 1,65%
4,25 5,499999 A 1,40%
5,5 6,499999 A+ 1,30%
6,5 8,499999 AA 1,15%
8,50 100000 AAA 0,65%
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Appendix 11: Ten year government bond spreads (Source: Financial Times [December 2012]) 
 
Appendix 12: Country Credit Rating & Risk Premium (Source: Damodaran, 
(http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html) 
“This table summarizes the latest bond ratings and appropriate default spreads for different 
countries. While you can use these numbers as rough estimates of country risk premiums, you 
may want to modify the premia to reflect the additonal risk of equity markets. To estimate the 
long term country risk premium, I start with the country rating (from Moody's: 
www.moodys.com) and estimate the default spread for that rating (based upon traded 
country bonds) over a default free government bond rate. This becomes a measure of the 
added country risk premium for that country. I add this default spread to the historical risk 
premium for a mature equity market (estimated from US historical data) to estimate the total 
risk premium. In the short term especially, the equity country risk premium is likely to be 
greater than the country's default spread. You can estimate an adjusted country risk premium 
by multiplying the default spread by the relative equity market volatility for that market (Std 
dev in country equity market/Std dev in country bond). I have used the emerging market 
average of 1.5 (equity markets are about 1.5 times more volatile than bond markets) to 





Germany Western Europe Aaa 0 6.00%
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estimate country risk premium. I have added this to my estimated risk premium of 6% for 
mature markets (obtained by looking at the implied premium for the S&P 500) to get the total 
risk premium.” 
Source: Damodaran 2012 (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html) 
 
Appendix 13: Portucel Changes in Provisions forecast (Source: Portucel Annual Reports & own calculations) 
 
Changes in Provisions 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Provisions 1.499 26.047 9.946 13.540 (21.464) 1.165 (5.611) (6.489) 6.570 3.796 1.733 (13.892) 21.412
Increases 1.499 26.518 25.706 37.457 1.298 22.744 16.145 342 19.197 13.880 31.593 2.185 31.713
Legal 1.499 458 395 1.919 687 2 383 0 927 321 239 1.709 359
Tax 0 13.919 11.684 0 0 10.966 15.762 0 0 13.083 13.083 0 13.083
Other 0 12.141 13.627 35.539 610 11.776 0 342 18.271 476 18.271 476 18.271
Decreases (37) (471) (15.760) (23.918) (22.762) (21.579) (21.756) (6.831) (12.628) (10.084) (29.859) (16.077) (10.301)
Legal (37) (471) (736) (365) (508) (668) (461) 0 (869) (949) (624) (400) (689)
Tax 0 0 (2.806) (23.154) (2.393) 0 (21.295) 0 (5.433) 0 (19.624) (6.541) 0
Other 0 0 (12.218) (398) (19.861) (20.912) 0 (6.831) (6.326) (9.135) (9.611) (9.135) (9.611)
Direct utilizations (626) (12) 0 (5.850) 0 (112) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Legal (626) (12) 0 0 0 (112) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tax 0 0 0 (5.850) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Provisions account at year-end 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Legal 1.801 1.776 363 1.917 2.097 1.432 1.354 1.354 1.412 784 400 1.709 1.379
Tax 0 13.919 31.397 2.393 0 10.966 5.433 5.433 0 13.083 6.541 0 13.083
Other 153 12.294 6.174 41.314 22.063 12.815 12.815 6.326 18.271 9.611 18.271 9.611 18.271
000€ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Revenues 1.029.086 1.080.659 1.147.395 1.131.936 1.095.309 1.385.456 1.487.884 1.485.495 1.635.131 1.638.714 1.668.179 1.693.587 1.724.810
Other Operating Income 22.359 23.503 20.652 25.957 34.742 22.859 21.483 24.508 24.949 25.448 25.982 26.528 27.059
Change in the fair value of biological assets 2.214 (12.943) (371) (98) (4.537) (7.787) 267 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cost of inventories sold and consumed (351.122) (357.840) (420.015) (502.676) (485.156) (517.223) (580.269) (609.229) (694.688) (709.516) (728.288) (742.906) (756.629)
Cost of materials and services consumed (295.869) (300.164) (288.407) (281.797) (288.945) (336.907) (358.296) (376.179) (428.946) (438.102) (449.694) (458.720) (467.193)
Payroll costs (115.955) (107.850) (113.844) (112.046) (114.744) (127.020) (133.713) (125.884) (124.501) (123.133) (122.145) (121.250) (120.458)
Other costs and losses (20.386) (11.410) (7.252) (17.148) (15.857) (13.575) (13.530) (14.491) (14.752) (15.047) (15.363) (15.685) (15.999)
Variation in production (3.384) (1.436) 2.582 27.590 1.348 (5.635) (38.753) (943) 0 0 0 0 0
Provisions (1.499) (26.047) (9.946) (13.540) 21.464 (1.165) 5.611 6.489 (6.570) (3.796) (1.733) 13.892 (21.412)
EBITDA 265.445 286.472 330.795 258.179 243.624 399.002 390.684 389.766 390.624 374.569 376.938 395.445 370.177
Depreciation, amortization and impairment losses (132.181) (77.161) (70.472) (77.048) (111.544) (121.185) (124.527) (104.732) (101.044) (97.696) (94.466) (91.349) (88.340)
EBIT 133.264 209.311 260.323 181.131 132.080 277.817 266.156 285.035 289.580 276.873 282.472 304.097 281.837
Share of loss/gains of associated companies (124) 0 0 0 0 0 594 788 691 691 691 691 691
Net Financial Costs (47.439) (26.457) (27.541) (19.635) (7.545) (20.079) (16.346) (25.240) (22.356) (26.040) (38.622) (41.385) (43.701)
Profit before income tax 85.701 182.855 232.782 161.496 124.534 257.737 250.404 260.582 267.915 251.523 244.541 263.402 238.827
Income tax (22.415) (58.184) (78.811) (30.423) (19.462) (47.157) (54.058) (73.224) (75.284) (64.390) (62.602) (67.431) (61.140)
Net Profit 63.286 124.671 153.971 131.073 105.072 210.580 196.346 187.359 192.631 187.133 181.938 195.971 177.687
Non-controlling interests (6) (18) (19) (1) (7) (8) (14) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11) (11)
Net profit attributable to equityholders 63.280 124.653 153.952 131.072 105.065 210.572 196.331 187.348 192.620 187.123 181.928 195.961 177.677
Appendix 14: Portucel Income Statement forecast (Source: Portucel Annual Report & own calculations) 
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Secil Cement Sales (1000t) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Portugal 3.474 3.551 3.217 2.779 2.712 2.603 2.040 1.932 1.829 1.732 1.657 1.586
Lebanon 806 965 989 1.086 1.112 1.150 1.260 1.341 1.414 1.477 1.542 1.595
Tunisia 1.130 1.155 1.297 1.335 1.362 1.170 1.349 1.418 1.520 1.629 1.763 1.942
Angola 174 237 295 307 196 229 294 345 395 441 483 525
Cape Verde 44 34 28 48 52 54 55 57 60 65 77 95
 
Assets
Non-Current Assets 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Goodwill 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756 376.756
Other intangible assets 13.243 2.205 1.419 4.601 2.341 94 2.777 3.812 3.812 3.812 3.812 3.812 3.812
Property, Plant and Equipment 1.153.312 1.087.130 1.053.232 1.220.048 1.626.391 1.604.130 1.529.709 1.497.353 1.462.033 1.419.693 1.379.012 1.339.904 1.302.284
Biological Assets 136.239 123.295 122.925 122.827 118.290 110.503 110.769 110.615 124.823 144.267 162.988 167.083 164.143
Available-for-sale financial assets 0 516 130 130 130 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
Investment in associates 358 0 0 0 0 516 1.779 1.752 1.101 1.101 1.101 1.101 1.101
Deferred tax assets 63.739 42.146 23.526 17.486 17.763 22.964 46.272 44.684 39.045 38.481 37.941 37.080 36.082
Total 1.743.648 1.632.049 1.577.989 1.741.849 2.141.672 2.115.089 2.068.188 2.035.099 2.007.696 1.984.236 1.961.736 1.925.862 1.884.304
Current Assets
Inventories 131.113 117.556 141.835 240.318 147.269 172.900 188.691 184.665 203.568 203.540 206.720 209.705 213.569
Receivables and other current assets 226.498 249.541 318.463 199.553 168.191 212.840 242.257 271.673 299.483 299.442 304.120 308.511 314.197
State and other public entities 36.132 24.683 35.211 47.070 51.477 32.228 54.684 40.212 40.212 40.212 40.212 40.212 40.212
Cash and cash equivalents 89.521 268.899 385.165 222.549 52.549 133.959 267.432 183.812 164.110 144.407 224.705 188.336 151.967
Total 483.264 660.678 880.674 709.490 419.486 551.926 753.064 680.362 707.372 687.601 775.757 746.764 719.946
TOTAL ASSETS 2.226.912 2.292.728 2.458.662 2.451.338 2.561.158 2.667.016 2.821.252 2.715.461 2.715.068 2.671.838 2.737.493 2.672.625 2.604.249
EQUITY AND LIABILITIES
Capital and Reserves 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Share Capital 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500 767.500
Treasury shares (54) (54) (54) (24.431) (26.788) (26.788) (42.155) (88.896) (88.896) (88.896) (88.896) (88.896) (88.896)
Fair value reserves (1.506) 5.486 7.755 5.245 (1.456) 78 (523) (144) 0 0 0 0 0
Other (legal) reserves 67.602 76.186 80.732 89.929 42.330 47.006 57.547 66.218 66.218 66.218 66.218 66.218 66.218
Currency translation reserve (78) 43 37 261 242 882 (486) (1.497) 0 0 0 0 0
Retained earnings from previous years 135.029 149.617 166.084 276.449 383.419 304.020 499.721 525.116 505.854 487.141 468.949 449.353 431.585
Net profit for the year 63.291 124.653 153.952 131.074 105.080 210.588 196.331 187.348 192.620 187.123 181.928 195.961 177.677
Shareholders' Equity 1.031.784 1.123.430 1.176.007 1.246.027 1.270.326 1.303.286 1.477.935 1.455.645 1.443.296 1.419.087 1.395.699 1.390.135 1.354.084
Non controlling interests 171 182 237 231 230 217 221 227 227 227 227 227 227
TOTAL EQUITY 1.031.955 1.123.612 1.176.244 1.246.258 1.270.556 1.303.503 1.478.156 1.455.873 1.443.524 1.419.314 1.395.926 1.390.363 1.354.311
Non-Current Liabilities
Deferred tax liabilities 88.004 108.227 113.214 126.838 138.441 164.999 193.237 105.991 106.387 106.852 109.103 91.320 89.850
Pensions and other post-employment benefits 36.464 34.048 16.309 24.501 19.518 13.714 16.683 19.621 19.694 19.780 20.197 16.905 16.633
Provisions 1.954 27.989 37.935 45.624 24.160 25.213 19.603 20.788 20.865 20.957 21.398 17.910 17.622
Interest-bearing liabilities 747.420 738.495 692.012 686.887 420.985 729.697 566.813 501.235 681.533 461.831 742.128 705.759 469.390
Other non-current liabilities 32.675 21.652 20.602 17.522 28.077 24.471 18.109 19.514 19.587 19.672 20.087 16.813 16.542
Total 906.517 930.410 880.073 901.372 631.182 958.094 814.444 667.148 848.066 629.091 912.914 848.708 610.038
Current Liabilities
Interest-bearing liabilities 78.240 10.464 60.856 16.095 331.312 91.250 164.085 235.912 35.912 235.912 35.912 35.912 235.912
Payables and other current liabilities 182.464 187.859 259.882 248.702 272.530 264.839 284.893 303.211 334.249 334.204 339.425 344.326 350.672
State and other public entities 27.737 40.384 81.607 38.912 55.578 49.329 79.673 53.317 53.317 53.317 53.317 53.317 53.317
Total 288.440 238.706 402.345 303.708 659.420 405.418 528.652 592.440 423.478 623.432 428.653 433.555 639.900
TOTAL LIABILITIES 1.194.957 1.169.116 1.282.418 1.205.080 1.290.602 1.363.513 1.343.096 1.259.588 1.271.544 1.252.524 1.341.567 1.282.263 1.249.938
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 2.226.912 2.292.728 2.458.662 2.451.338 2.561.158 2.667.016 2.821.252 2.715.461 2.715.068 2.671.838 2.737.493 2.672.625 2.604.249
Appendix 15: Portucel Balance Sheet forecast (Source: Portucel Annual Report & own calculations) 
Appendix 16: Secil Cement Sales forecast in thousand tons (Source: Secil Annual Reports & own calculations) 
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Country Average 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Portugal -9% -11% 0% -8% -15% -6% -16% -7% -5% -5% -5% -4% -4%
Lebanon 11% 9% 18% 7% 7% 16% 7% 7% 6% 5% 4% 4% 3%
Tunisia 2% 2% 2% 3% 5% 10% -8% 5% 5% 7% 7% 8% 10%
Angola 18% 26% 33% 20% 4% -7% 29% 22% 18% 15% 12% 10% 9%
Cape Verde 4% 4% 26% -17% 5% 2% 4% 4% 6% 8% 19% 23%
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Revenue 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Portugal 339.138 366.221 380.998 335.540 304.909 274.201 238.464 236.889 231.533 226.305 221.569 217.929
Cement 207.036 226.992 246.291 218.617 200.123 174.116 141.844 141.788 138.739 136.397 132.787 129.215
Concrete 122.343 123.732 120.137 102.990 88.675 85.263 82.705 81.464 79.020 75.860 75.101 74.350
Other products 9.759 15.497 14.570 13.932 16.110 14.822 13.915 13.637 13.773 14.049 13.680 14.364
Lebanon 0 47.809 56.748 69.704 77.109 80.659 90.652 99.122 108.564 119.060 129.172 138.499
Cement 0 42.053 50.137 62.034 69.460 73.052 82.817 90.817 99.594 109.732 119.190 128.219
Concrete 0 5.756 6.611 7.670 7.649 7.607 7.835 8.305 8.970 9.328 9.981 10.281
Tunisia 43.744 46.659 53.447 60.372 64.818 60.910 62.234 66.355 73.283 86.418 99.961 110.995
Cement 39.309 41.534 47.424 52.426 56.626 52.381 53.193 56.590 63.226 75.254 88.574 99.039
Concrete 4.435 5.125 6.023 7.947 8.192 8.529 9.041 9.764 10.057 11.163 11.387 11.956
Angola 33.343 31.994 45.784 48.572 27.777 30.755 35.954 39.007 43.880 46.689 54.070 58.164
Cement 33.343 31.994 45.784 48.572 27.777 30.755 35.954 39.007 43.880 46.689 54.070 58.164
Cape Verde 10.101 7.033 4.887 6.404 6.079 6.630 6.626 6.607 6.687 6.929 8.338 10.548
Cement 8.786 7.033 4.071 5.397 5.399 5.827 5.799 5.749 5.779 5.950 7.175 9.119
Other products 1.315 0 817 1.007 680 804 827 858 908 979 1.163 1.429
Others 41.455 64.458 56.648 51.638 55.127 53.748 53.846 51.597 51.339 50.312 51.318 51.575
Revenue 467.781 564.175 598.512 572.230 535.819 506.903 487.776 499.577 515.285 535.713 564.427 587.711
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Revenues 467.781 565.921 599.991 573.588 535.819 506.903 491.500 485.818 505.418 530.960 564.049 596.934
Earnings of associates and JV 2.336 922 325 24 (631) 349 198 198 198 198 198 198
Change in production inventories (973) 2.227 7.750 (5.883) 227 2.594 (3.428) 1.006 5.172 (2.057) 604 1.301
Cost of sales and materials consumed (117.251) (153.444) (168.452) (149.150) (142.181) (157.782) (152.071) (144.993) (143.316) (146.571) (153.978) (160.754)
External supplies and services (164.881) (182.819) (201.137) (185.434) (182.787) (182.215) (174.882) (167.110) (165.178) (171.842) (180.526) (191.777)
Personnel costs (67.682) (78.563) (80.189) (80.763) (82.600) (81.485) (82.962) (84.150) (85.151) (86.534) (88.030) (89.457)
Impairment of inventories 0 (690) (254) 324 (774) (690) (411) (391) (387) (396) (416) (434)
Impairment of accounts receivable (2.004) (2.804) (3.782) (2.747) (2.834) (3.224) (2.703) (2.672) (2.780) (2.920) (3.102) (3.283)
Provisions (14.262) (81) 26 416 (141) (3.417) 55 100 (65) 221 149 (96)
Other income and gains 91.882 12.536 78.805 37.245 45.216 63.569 56.209 50.560 53.888 56.057 54.178 53.671
Other costs and losses (71.875) (17.258) (74.035) (33.594) (9.563) (12.623) (11.093) (11.858) (11.475) (11.667) (11.571) (11.619)
Reversal of depreciations and adjustments 11.959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBITDA 135.286 145.947 159.049 154.026 159.874 131.863 120.412 126.508 156.322 165.449 181.554 194.684
Depreciations and Amortizations (56.694) (61.487) (56.793) (53.284) (81.930) (85.137) (86.550) (90.077) (91.314) (93.522) (95.863) (97.805)
Imparment of depreciable assets (37) 133 (2.486) 291 0 (827) (88) (88) (88) (88) (88) (88)
EBIT 78.555 84.593 99.769 101.033 77.945 45.900 33.774 36.343 64.920 71.839 85.604 96.791
Interest income 10.688 2.312 3.042 2.896 2.740 2.994 2.797 2.894 2.864 2.858 2.881 2.859
Interest expense (19.528) (11.775) (11.689) (8.260) (7.638) (9.163) (10.913) (10.305) (10.871) (10.591) (11.478) (11.227)
EBT 69.715 75.130 91.122 95.669 73.047 39.731 25.658 28.932 56.914 64.105 77.007 88.422
Income Tax (11.588) (19.763) (20.790) (12.896) (16.553) (10.227) (6.286) (7.088) (13.944) (15.706) (18.867) (21.663)
Net income 58.128 55.367 70.332 82.773 56.494 29.504 19.372 21.844 42.970 48.400 58.141 66.759
Attributable to:
Equityholders 50.409 62.777 70.154 47.344 22.935 15.497 17.475 34.376 38.720 46.512 53.407
Minority interests 4.958 7.555 12.619 9.150 6.570 3.874 4.369 8.594 9.680 11.628 13.352
Dividends 19.009 42.020 37.017 28.754 18.348 14.722 13.980 22.344 25.168 27.907 32.044
Legal Reserves 2.520 3.139 3.508 2.367 1.147 775 874 1.719 1.936 2.326 2.670
Other Reserves 28.880 17.618 29.629 16.222 3.440 0 2.621 10.313 5.808 16.279 18.692
Retained Earnings 0 0 (40) 0 0 0 0 0 5.808 0 0
50.409 62.777 70.114 47.344 22.935 15.497 17.475 34.376 38.720 46.512 53.407
